



Al-Maktoum Institute for Arabic and Islamic Studies

**TOWARDS THE CONQUEST OF
ISLAMIC JERUSALEM**

**The Three Main Practical Steps taken by
Prophet Muhammad**

Analytical Study

**Abdallah Ma'rouf Omar
04935268**

Supervisors:

**Dr. Maher Abu Munshar
Dr. Alhaji Manta Drammeh**

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of M.Litt. in Islamic Jerusalem Studies at the Al-Maktoum Institute for Arabic and Islamic Studies, the University of Aberdeen.

2004 / 2005

Dedication

To the greatest man throughout the history, who taught me how to become a human, my beloved **Prophet Muhammad** Peace be upon him.

To the beloved one that lives in my heart despite the long distance that separates

us: **Islamic Jerusalem**, the place of my dreams and life, and to **those great people** who loved that holiness as I did, and gave all what they could for this

land to live and light the way for all humanity. To my beloved jewel: **al-Aqsa**.

To my **father and mother**, who gave me their life to become a better human.

To my beloved **wife**, who supported me always through the long distances, and

to **my children**, to become the next generation that loves this land and serves it.

To my **father and mother in law**, my **family**, my **teachers** and my **students**.

To all of them, I dedicate this Dissertation

إلى أعظم إنسان في التاريخ، الرجل العِملاق الذي علّمني كيف أكون إنساناً، أستاذي وقُدوتي ومُعلمي

الأول وسيدِ الناس والخلق أجمعين: سيدنا محمد رسول الله، صلى الله عليه وعلى آله وأصحابه

أجمعين صلاةً طيبةً زكيةً طاهرةً عامّةً تامّةً إلى يوم القيامة وسلّم تسليمًا كثيرًا.

إلى رفيقة الروح، تلك المعشوقة التي ما قنّنت في قلبي تحادّثني وأحاديثها رغم بُعد المسافات، مسجدي

ومدينتي وأرضي الغالية: بيت المقدس، وإلى هؤلاء العُظماء الذين قدّموا كلّ ما كان بين أيديهم خدمة

لها، لتضيء هذه الأرض الطاهرة بنورها الوضّاء سبيل البشرية، وإلى الجوهرة العظيمة التي تُزيّن

بجلالها جبين الأرض المقدّسة: المسجد الأقصى المبارك.

إلى أمي وأبي الحبيبين، اللذين أعطيانني عمراًهما ليَجْعلا مِنّي رجلاً يَفخران به يوم القيامة بإذن الله.

إلى زوجتي الحبيبة، التي كانت وما زالت معي رغم كلّ الظروف والصّعوبات، وزهرتي الغالية:

مُحمّد ومَعروف، لعلّ الله تعالى يجعلهما من جيل النصر الآتي لخدمة الأرض المقدّسة.

إلى حمويّ الغالبيين، وأسرتي الحبيبة، وكلّ أساتذتي وكلّ طلابي...

Acknowledgment

First of All, Praise and Thanks be to Almighty GOD, the Lord of the Universe, who gave me the mind to think and the ability to do this work, and I ask Him to accept this work from me.

I would like to express my sincere appreciation and thanks to His Highness Sheikh Hamdan bin Rashid Al-Maktoum, who gave me this great opportunity to continue my post-graduate studies in the field that I always loved and dreamed to continue my academic life within.

I would like also to express my warm feelings and great thanks to Prof. Abd al-Fattah El-Awaisi, who was for me as my father and opened the gates and horizons for me to search and seek knowledge.

Many thanks, as well, to my respected supervisors: Dr. Maher Abu Munshar, and Dr. Alhaji Manta Drammeh for their great support and help, and I would never forget Prof. Malory Nye and Dr. Julia Droeber for their support and cooperation. I also would like to thank all the members of staff in Al-Maktoum Institute, for their great efforts in helping the students and making sure of their comfort.

I would like to express my deep and warm thanks to my beloved parents: Marouf Omar and Sanaa' Qasem, my beloved wife: Sajeda Bkeirat, my two little flowers: dear sons Mohammed and Marouf, my parents-in-law: Shaikh Najeh Bkeirat and Fadwa Bkeirat, my brothers Amr, Mohammed, and Ahmed, my sister Sireen and here family: Ahmad, Sultan, and Munia, and to all my family, for being there always and for their great support in the hardest times.

I would never forget to thank my teacher and friend who raised me up since I was a child until now, and gave me his support and advice: Mr. Jihad al-Adam, and my dear friends in the UK: Khalid El-Awaisi, Rashid Patel and all my colleagues in Al-Maktoum Institute. My beloved friends in Jerusalem and Palestine: Dr. Haithem al-Ratrout, Fu'ad Hamdiyya, my friends in al-Aqsa mosque, 'Ā'idūn and Yafa Cultural Centre. My dear friend in Jordan: Jihad Abu

al-Eis, who was one of the main reasons of completing my post-graduate studies by his encouragement for me to come and continue my studies, all the family of Assabeel newspaper, and all the members who served and helped me in the University of Jordan. I would like also to thank Prof. Fathiyyah al-Nabrawi in al-Azhar University in Egypt for her great support and appreciated comments.

Finally, I express my thanks and appreciation to all my friends, teachers, my students and all those whom I could not mention all over the world, who supported me with their comments, suggestions, or prayers. To all of them I say:

Shukran Jazīlan

Thank you very much

Contents

Dedication	ii
Acknowledgment	iii
Contents	v
List of Tables	vi
List of Figures	vi
System of Transliteration	vii
Introduction	1
0.1 Background	1
0.2 The significance of the research	4
0.3 Aims and Objectives	5
0.4 Problem of the research	5
0.5 Methodology and Approach	6
0.6 Difficulties	7
0.7 Literature review	9
0.8 Dissertation Plan and Structure	12
Chapter One: The Battle of Mu'tah (8 A.H. – 629 C.E.)	15
1.1 Introduction	15
1.2 The significance of the time of the battle	16
1.3 The reasons for the battle	17
1.4 The destination	21
1.5 Other facts of the Battle of Mu'tah	25
1.6 The result of the battle	27
1.7 The significance of the Battle of Mu'tah	29
1.8 Conclusion	31
Chapter Two: The <i>Ghazwah</i> of Tabūk (9 A.H. – 630 C.E.)	32
2.1 Introduction	32
2.2 The uniqueness of the <i>Ghazwah</i> of Tabūk	32
2.3 The reasons for the <i>Ghazwah</i>	33
2.4 The choice of the area of Tabūk	40
2.5 The <i>ḥadīth</i> of conquering Islamicjerusalem	43
2.6 The significance of Tabūk during the conquest of Islamicjerusalem	47
2.7 Conclusion	50
Chapter Three: The <i>Ba'th</i> of Usāmah bin Zaid (11 A.H. – 632 C.E.)	51
3.1 Introduction	51
3.2 The reasons for this <i>Ba'th</i>	52
3.3 The destination	55
3.4 The significance of the <i>Ba'th</i> of Usāmah	64

3.5 Conclusion	68
Conclusion	69
Bibliography	74
Appendix	82

List of Tables

Table 1: Opinions of some scholars concerning the destination of the <i>Ba'th</i> of Usāmah	59
Table 2: Summarising the opinions of scholars on the destination of the <i>Ba'th</i> of Usāmah	60

List of Figures

Figure 1: The location of Mu'tah	22
Figure 2: The extents of the boundaries of Islamic Jerusalem according to al-Maqdisī	23
Figure 3: The location of the town of al-Mushayrifah (Mashārif at the time of the battle of Mu'tah)	25
Figure 4: The location of Tabūk	41
Figure 5: The location of al-Mazār	63
Figure 6: Page 8 Recto from a manuscript of <i>Sunan Abū Dāwūd</i>	82
Figure 7: Page 248 Recto from a manuscript of <i>Sunan Abū Dāwūd</i>	83

System of Transliteration

Arabic	Transliteration
ء	'
ا	a
ب	b
ت	t
ث	th
ج	j
ح	ḥ
خ	kh
د	d
ذ	dh
ر	r
ز	z
س	s
ش	sh
ص	ṣ
ض	ḍ
ط	ṭ
ظ	ẓ
ع	'
غ	gh
ف	f
ق	q
ك	k
ل	l
م	m
ن	n
هـ	h
و	w
ي	y
آ	ā
ؤ	ū
ي	ī
اَ	a
اِ	i
اُ	u



Introduction

0.1 Background:

Centuries ago, a unique relationship between Muslims and Islamic Jerusalem was established. ‘Umar bin al-Khaṭṭāb was the first caliph to succeed in conquering Islamic Jerusalem for the first time in the Muslim history. An important aspect here is that the conquest occurred only five years after the death of Prophet Muhammad. This exemplifies the special importance of that region (Islamic Jerusalem) for the Muslims, in that they succeeded in conquering it within a brief period after the death of the Prophet.

The era of Prophet Muhammad and his relationship with Islamic Jerusalem, **as a political leader**, has not been tackled very well. In general, the studies of the relationship between the Muslims and Islamic Jerusalem usually start from the time of Abū Bakr and ‘Umar bin al-Khaṭṭāb. Therefore, it is necessary that the relationship between the Prophet, as a political leader of the Muslim Nation, and Islamic Jerusalem, be studied thoroughly, not only through the traditional status of Islamic Jerusalem in Islam and its importance.

As those who conquered Islamic Jerusalem during ‘Umar’s time were the companions of Prophet Muhammad. This has given the researcher the impression that they probably had a connection that linked them with Prophet Muhammad (as the first leader of the Muslim nation) and this region. This is believed to be the main element that made the Muslims become more active



and the more determined to conquer this region, which raised a question in the researcher's mind: Did Prophet Muhammad himself encourage his companions to conquer Islamic Jerusalem? Or did he try to conquer that region? Or was it only a case of *Ijtihād*¹ by the companions?

Did the Prophet himself do something that could be understood as being a practical step towards conquering Islamic Jerusalem? This is a very important issue, since it resolves the problematic case of showing the main reasons and motivations of the companions that made them spend a number of years trying their best to conquer this region; what motivated them? What gave them that determination? Was it because they knew that the Prophet was preparing to conquer the region or did they simply just want to conquer it?

To answer these questions, one shall study these incidents and events occurring during the life-time of Prophet Muhammad that could have a link with Islamic Jerusalem, and investigate how his words and acts can be understood in that context.

In 1997, Abd al-Fattah El-Awaisi argued that:

The Prophet Muhammad turned his attention to saving and conquering Jerusalem from early on. The preparations for the campaign to conquer Jerusalem, through action to safeguard the edges of Syria from the danger of the Byzantines and to destroy their prestige. This occurred through three events in the Prophet Muhammad's lifetime, which were: the battle of Mu'ta in 8 AH

¹ *Ijtihād* is translated according to Qal'ajī as "Independent reasoning" (Qal'ajī 1988: 43), In other words, it could be argued that it is the effort made to deduce laws from the primary sources, which are Qur'an and the *Summa* of the Prophet.



(629 AD), the raid to Tabuk in 9 AH (630 AD), and Usama Ibn Zaid's mission in 11 AH (631 AD). (El-Awaisi 1997: 24)

However, in 2005, El-Awaisi developed a hypothesis, arguing in an unpublished book, namely "Introducing Islamicjerusalem", that the Prophet drew a plan to conquer Islamicjerusalem during his lifetime, and that this plan was fulfilled and put into practice by his successor, Abū Bakr, after the death of the Prophet.²

The dissertation will examine this hypothesis, to discover whether there are any connections between these three incidents and the conquest of Islamicjerusalem. The researcher will examine if it can be argued that the Prophet took some practical steps or made preparations that afterwards led to the conquest of Islamicjerusalem by his companions. These three incidents are the ones that – the researcher argues – can be called the Three Main Practical Steps of the Prophet: the Battle of Mu'tah, the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk, and the *Ba'th* of Usāmah bin Zaid.

The researcher will study the relationship between Islamicjerusalem and these incidents; this will not be a descriptive narration of the incidents. Rather will the researcher analyse their events and see if there were connections or a relationship between them and Islamicjerusalem.

² This argument has been mentioned in the third chapter of the book, namely 'The Land of *Amal* Hope, Discussion of the Prophet Muhammad Plan for Islamicjerusalem', this book is to be published in 2005, and the researcher has taken this argument from the draft of the book. The researcher highly appreciates El-Awaisi's help in giving him the opportunity to read the chapter and discuss it with him, since it has opened up new horizons on the subject for the researcher.



0.2 The significance of the research:

In the beginning, the Battle of Mu'tah was the first direct conflict between the Muslims and the Byzantines. Not only this, it was also the first military act of the Muslims outside the Arab Peninsula, as well as being the first in the *al-Shām* (Historical Syria) region. These facts make Mu'tah a very important aspect in studying the relationship between the Prophet and Islamicjerusalem and his vision towards conquering this region.

The *Ghazwah* of Tabūk was the last one in the Prophet Muhammad's life. Its time was important, happening as it did only one year after the conquest of Makkah, and one year before the Prophet died. Not only that, but this was the furthest place that the Prophet reached in a military campaign during his Prophethood. However, it is well known that Prophet Muhammad had been to Islamicjerusalem many years before this *Ghazwah*. This was during the Night Journey before his migration to Madīnah, but this will not be studied here, since the study is focused on the Prophet as a political leader.

Finally, in the case of the *Ba'th* of Usāmah bin Zaid; this *Ba'th* was the last military act of Prophet Muhammad before his death, and was towards an area around or inside the region of Islamicjerusalem as some scholars have said. This could mean the start of the military campaign towards Islamicjerusalem that took place after the death of the Prophet.



0.3 Aims and Objectives:

The researcher argues that there is a clear lack of research covering the Prophet's era and its relationship with Islamicjerusalem. Much research that has studied the history of Islamicjerusalem begins with the first Muslim conquest by 'Umar bin al-Khaṭṭāb. However, the researcher has been unable to find a thorough research that has given a special importance to the time of the Prophet Muhammad. This may be due to the fact that Islamicjerusalem had not yet been conquered by the Muslims during the Prophet's time. Therefore, most of the research studying the time of the Prophet has concentrated on the status and the significance of Islamicjerusalem in Islam, and has done so by examining the traditions of the Prophet that showed the importance of this region in Islam.

The researcher also argues that these incidents could be a very important element in showing the vision of the Prophet Muhammad towards Islamicjerusalem; this will help researchers to understand one of the most important elements of the new field of inquiry of Islamicjerusalem studies, namely, the vision.

0.4 Problem of the research:

The main aim was to study whether or not it could be argued that Prophet Muhammad took some practical steps towards conquering Islamicjerusalem. The research will tackle only three incidents and conclude whether they could be considered as practical steps towards conquering Islamicjerusalem.



Arguing that these three events were practical steps that the Prophet took to conquer Islamicjerusalem means that he took other steps other than practical ones. This will give new ideas into the understanding of the vision of Prophet Muhammad towards Islamicjerusalem as well.

0.5 Methodology and Approach:

As the topic shows, this project will be a historical study; however, since it is related to Prophet Muhammad's life, the sources of this study will differ from other historical studies dealing with other periods.

This dissertation will be a Qualitative Study based on Historical Methodology. The researcher's approach will be divided into steps: First, to find narrations of the incidents in their order, which will be through the books of *ḥadīth* and *sīrah*. The researcher will then analyse these incidents and find any related *ḥadīths* of the Prophet. After this, the researcher will try to find the links between these narrations of the Prophet's acts or sayings and why the events happened.

Through this, the researcher will try to find the links between those events and Islamicjerusalem by looking into what happened in the future, i.e. during the campaign to conquer Islamicjerusalem after the death of the Prophet, and will examine whether a relationship between the event that occurred in these incidents and Islamicjerusalem to be found. In this way the researcher can state



his argument for the reasons for the incidents and their events in a new look at the relationship between them and Islamic Jerusalem.

This will lead to the conclusion as to whether Prophet Muhammad's vision and intention in these incidents could be understood as being towards conquering Islamic Jerusalem or not; to conclude, the researcher will put forward suggestions related to this research.

During the dealing with the historical sources in this study (mainly the *ḥadīth*, *sīrah* and history books), the researcher will start by gathering the different narrations that are related to the event that he is studying; then he will analyse this in depth, connecting the narrations and the opinions of the scholars, as well as his own understanding of the narrations, based on his readings and insight, and this will lead to the conclusions.

It may be noted that the researcher will organise the bibliography alphabetically. As for the names of the authors that start with 'Ibn', 'Abū', 'El' and 'Al', the letter that follows will be considered.

0.6 Difficulties:

The researcher faced some difficulties during the research; the books of *ḥadīth* have sometimes many narrations for the same tradition, and sometimes these narrations contradict each other. In the research, the researcher will deal with this problem if it occurs by examining the authenticity of the contradicted



narrations and comparing them; in this way the more authentic narration will be taken, and the others will not be considered even though mentioned by the researcher, who will reveal the contradictions that have occurred and the procedure that he has taken.

Another problem could be the lack of evidence produced by some scholars to prove their opinions. Some do not mention their source of information, only referring to the argument, which could be a problem for any researcher trying to find reasons why a scholar mentioned such an argument in the first place. However, this can be solved by background reading on the topic, giving the researcher more insight and knowledge for the reasons behind such unsupported arguments.

The researcher did not face the difficulty in a lack of sources, as the books of *ḥadīth*, *sīrah*, history and *Tafsīr* can be found easily, and they spoke widely about the three incidents with different narrations and opinions. The real problem was the lack of English-language references; most of the historical sources that are related to the topic are written in the Arabic language, as most were written by early Muslim scholars in Arabic, centuries ago. Such a serious lack of translation would lead the researcher into having to translate these narrations from the Arabic sources into the English language himself, which could need a long time. However, there are quite good translations of the main *ḥadīth* sources like *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī* and *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*, as well as some *Tafsīr* books like al-Ṭabarī's, and other *sīrah* books like Ibn Hishām's. This will greatly help the researcher, and he will try to rely on ready translations of the



ḥadīths that he can find. If accurate translations are not found, he will translate the narration as accurately as possible, depending on dictionaries etc.

Regarding the ethical issues that could face the researcher during the study; the researcher argues that this dissertation has a historical context and, thus, he does not consider the project to be involved in ethical issues, except for plagiarism and this will be totally avoided by naming the sources accurately.

0.7 Literature review:

The researcher will mainly use three types of books: first are the books of *sīrah* (The biography of Prophet Muhammad). Here the researcher will use many books, particularly the *Sīrah* of Ibn Ishāq, which is considered as one of the first books of *sīrah*. Unfortunately, the researcher could not find the original Arabic text of this book, so he will deal with the translation of this book by Guillaume; and there is also the *sīrah* of Ibn Hishām, which is considered the widest, biggest and one of the main core sources of *sīrah*, since it mentions many narrations with the chains of the narrators in order to be sure about the authenticity of the narrations. The researcher will use two copies of this book, one is the original Arabic text, and the other is *Summarizing the Sirah of Ibn Hisham* in the English language, edited by Sulaima al-Sheikh Mihammed, due to the need sometimes for this translation, and the need for the original Arabic text in other cases.



There are other important books of *sīrah* like the *sīrah* of Ibn Ḥibbān, Ibn Kathīr, and *Zād al-Ma‘ād* by Ibn al-Qayyim. One of the new books of *sīrah* that is very important, because of his analysis, is *al-Raḥeeq al-Makhtūm* (the Sealed Nectar) by al-Mubarakpuri. This book has many new analyses and new interpretations of the events of the life of the Prophet so the researcher will take these into consideration.

The books of *sīrah* will lead to the second source used in this dissertation, the books of history, especially the classic ones, since many of them speak about the life of the Prophet even while not specialising in it.

One of the history books that have a very important position is *al-Maghāzī* by al-Wāqidī. This is considered one of the oldest sources of the history of that era, as well as *Futūḥ al-Shām* by al-Wāqidī, which tackles the incidents that occurred after the death of Prophet Muhammad, particularly the Muslim campaign to conquer *al-Shām* (Historical Syria) and Islamic Jerusalem. All this will greatly aid the researcher in understanding the application of the steps of the Prophet in the time of the companions, which will further help to understand the vision of the Prophet and his steps.

Another important source is the history of *al-Ṭabarī*, which has a very important advantage. It mentions the chains of the narrators, which will help the researcher authenticate some events that have a relationship with the core of the research. Also the history of Ibn Kathīr is a very important source; its advantage



is the analysis of a writer who has often attempted to find the reasons for some of the incidents that occurred in the life of the Prophet.

In the case of Mu'tah in particular, there is a new book that has tried to gather together all the narrations about it. This is *Ghazwat Mu'tah* by Breik Abū Mayleh, and this book could prove to be a very good secondary source.

The third source is the books of *ḥadīth* (Traditions of the Prophet Mohammad), as these books have the exact narrations that can be examined as being authentic or non-authentic, this will help the researcher build up his arguments on strong bases.

For example: *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī* and *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim* have many *ḥadīths* that speak on these three incidents, particularly in the chapters of *al-Maghāzī*. There are other books in *ḥadīth* like the *Sunans* of al-Nasā'ī, Ibn Mājah and Abū Dawūd. The last book of the *Matn* (the text) of the *ḥadīth* is the *Musnad* of Imam Aḥmad bin Ḥanbal, which is the largest book of *ḥadīth* that can be considered reliable and almost authentic. However, it is worth to mention that the researcher will use two copies of the *Musnad* of Imam Aḥmad bin Ḥanbal in order to compare some differences in some narrations that affect the research.

As the researcher is studying the books of *ḥadīth*, he might need to refer to the books of *Rijāl* (Biographic books) in order to study the authenticity of some *ḥadīths*, like *al-Iṣābah fī Tamyīz al-Ṣaḥābah* by al-'Asqalānī who spoke in his book about the companions and their lives.



The *Tafsīr* (interpretations of the Qur'an) books will help the researcher in examining the arguments and evidences of the scholars who dealt with some incidents.³ The researcher will deal with some of the classic books of *Tafsīr* like the *Tafsīr* of al-Ṭabarī and Ibn Kathīr. There may be some new *Tafsīrs* like *al-Tafsīr al-Ḥadīth tartīb al-Suwar ḥasab al-Nuzūl* by Darwazah, which will help in dealing with the order of the revelation of the verses and chapters of the Qur'an that dealt with the incidents.

Other sources in different fields will include dictionaries and geography sources, and journals, manuscripts and electronic sources.

0.8 Dissertation Plan and Structure:

The dissertation is planned to contain three chapters; each chapter will tackle one incident.

In each chapter, the researcher will divide the study into three main questions related to the topic:

1. How are we to understand the reasons for the incidents? This is the main question in each chapter.

³ This could be seen for example in the *Tafsīr* of some verses of chapter 17 in the Qur'an: *al-Isrā'* (the Night Journey), in which some scholars mentioned a relationship between the Prophet's *Ghazwah* to Tabūk and conquering Islamicjerusalem like al-Ṭabarī and Ibn Kathīr for example (See Ṭabarī 1999: vol. 8, 121; Ibn Kathīr 2000: vol. 6, 85; See Qurṭubī 1998: vol. 5, 270).



2. How are we to interpret the reasons that made Prophet Muhammad choose the particular battle areas, i.e. the significance of the location?
3. How are we to interpret the reasons for some events being related to that incident, the mention of “conquering Islamicjerusalem” in Tabūk for example?

The first chapter will deal with the Battle of Mu’tah. It will be divided into:

1. Introduction.
2. The significance of the time of the battle.
3. The reasons for the battle.
4. The destination of the battle.
5. Other facts of the battle.
6. The result of the battle.
7. The significance of the battle.
8. Conclusion.

The second chapter will be on the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk; this chapter will deal with the following:

1. Introduction.
2. The uniqueness of the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk.
3. The reasons for the *Ghazwah*.
4. The choice of the area of Tabūk.
5. The *ḥadīth* of conquering Islamicjerusalem.
6. The significance of Tabūk during the conquest of Islamicjerusalem.
7. Conclusion.



The third chapter will be on the *Ba‘th* of Usāmah bin Zaid; it will deal with the following issues:

1. Introduction.
2. The reasons for this *Ba‘th*.
3. The destination of the *Ba‘th*.
4. The significance of the *Ba‘th* of Usāmah.
5. Conclusion.

At the end, the researcher will state his conclusions and recommendations.

Finally, the researcher hopes that this dissertation will help to widely develop Islamicjerusalem studies, and lead to a better understanding of this region and its history.



Chapter One

The Battle of Mu'tah (8 A.H. - 629 C.E.)

1.1 Introduction:

The battle of Mu'tah is one of the most important battles in the Muslim history. Its uniqueness comes from the fact that it is the first Muslim battle to occur outside the Arab Peninsula. It is also the first clash between Muslims and one of the two greatest Empires in the world at that time, namely the Byzantine.

In an attempt to examine the reasons behind the battle of Mu'tah, Ibrāhīm Bayḍūn (1997: 109-115) came to the conclusion that, from this battle, the Prophet wanted to open up the road to *al-Shām* as a whole.

However, the researcher makes the hypothesis that the Prophet's aim with this battle was different from that suggested by Bayḍūn. The researcher argues that this battle could be considered as the first practical step towards conquering Islamic Jerusalem. This chapter is an attempt to study the battle of Mu'tah in order to investigate whether it can be considered as the first step the Prophet made to conquer Islamic Jerusalem (as the researcher claims) or the first step to conquer *al-Shām* as a whole, as Bayḍūn claimed.



1.2 The significance of the time of the battle:

The majority of Muslim scholars agree that this battle occurred during *Jamādā al-Ūlā* (the fifth month of the lunar calendar) in the eighth year of *Higra*⁴.

What is important in studying the time of this battle is that it occurred only a few months before the conquest of Makkah, which took place in the ninth month of the year 8 A.H., as has been mentioned by many historians and scholars such as Safī-ur-Rahmān al-Mubarakpuri in his book *Ar-Raheeq al-Makhtum (the Sealed Nectar)* (see al-Mubarakpuri 1996: 383), and after about one year of the *al-Ḥudaybiya* treaty between the Prophet and the people of Makkah.

The researcher argues that it can be understood, from the time of the battle, that when the Prophet secured Makkah by treaty with *Quraysh* (the people of Makkah), that was held in *al-Ḥudaybiyah*, he eliminated the other danger that threatened the Muslims in the Arab Peninsula, namely, the Jews of *Khaybar* (through his *Ghazwah*⁵ to conquer *Khaybar*). Later, he began to take the first

⁴ In his book '*Ghazwat Mu'tah*', Briek Abū Māyleh said that there were other opinions, on the time of this battle, mentioned by Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, who stated that the battle took place in *Jamādā al-Thānīyah* (the sixth month of the lunar calendar) in the year 8 A.H.. On the other hand, Kahlīfa bin Khayyāt stated in a narration that the battle took place in the year 7 A.H., but in another opinion, he agreed with the majority of the scholars as to the time of the battle (See Briek 2004: 253-254).

⁵ The terminology *Ghazwah* was defined by Muhammad Rawwas Qal'ajī (1988: 331) as: "a large army unit with the Prophet himself leading the army". So, the scholars of the *Sīrah* of the Prophet used the terminology *Ghazwah* to refer to the battles or expedition in which the Prophet participated, and they used the terminology *Sariyyah* to refer to the military mission that the Prophet sent and in which he did not participate. Sometimes they used the terminology *ma'rakah* to refer to a battle in which the Prophet did not participate. However, the researcher argues that after reading the books of *sīrah*, only one exception to this case was found, which took place at *Mu'tah*; this was a big encounter when compared with other military missions. Some →



practical step to draw Muslim attention towards Islamic Jerusalem. This could be considered as a reminder to the Muslims of their first *qiblah* (direction of prayer), after they had been paying attention to “liberate”⁶ their present *qiblah* (which was Makkah) from the infidels for a long time.

1.3 The reasons for the battle:

With regards to the reasons for this battle, it may be noted that Breik quoted Akram Diyā’ al-‘Umarī when the latter stated that the only one who mentioned the direct reason for the battle was al-Wāqidī (d. 207 A.H.) (See Breik 2004: 247). The researcher agrees with Diyā’ al-‘Umarī that many of the scholars of *sīrah* and *ḥadīth*, as well as historians, did not mention a direct reason for the battle of Mu’tah, except for al-Wāqidī. He said that the direct reason was the assassination of al-Ḥārith bin ‘Umayr al-Azdī, the messenger of the Prophet to the king of Buṣrā, by Shuraḥbīl bin ‘Amr al-Ghassānī, the ruler of al-Karak and the area around it (including Mu’tah). This occurred when the Prophet sent his letters to the world leaders after the *al-Ḥudaybiya* treaty (al-Wāqidī 1966: (2) 755).

scholars, such as Ibn Kathīr and Ibn Hishām, even called it *Ghazwah*. This could be because of its importance as being the first clash with the Byzantine Empire, one of the two major empires in the world at that time. However, the researcher prefers to use the terminology “Battle” instead of *Ghazwah* to refer to Mu’tah.

The researcher could not find a suitable English terminology that could give an exact or near meaning of the terminology *Ghazwah*; for example, he found that Rohi (2001: 799) translated the terminology *Ghazwah* into: “invasion, incursion, raid, inroad, foray, attack, assault, military expedition or campaign, conquest”. However, the problem with these terminologies is that they do not convey the actual meaning of the *Ghazwah*, as was explained earlier. So, the researcher will use the Arabic terminology *Ghazwah* to refer to the event of Tabūk during this study.

⁶ According to Islamic thought, conquering Makkah and placing it under Islamic rule was a liberation, since it brought about the freedom of worshipping One God - as the true religion - in the holiest city in Islam, and freed the city from the mischief of the disbelievers, who had mistreated the holiness of the city and turned it into a centre to control all the Arab tribes in the Arab Peninsula. The researcher has used the terminology “liberate” to refer to the Muslim understanding of the conquest.



However, Breik (2004: 248) mentioned two other opinions concerning the main reason for the battle; the first was that the battle of Mu'tah occurred after the loss of 14 out of 15 of the companions of the Prophet during a mission to Dhāt Aṭlāḥ in the al-Balqā' region⁷ (the same region where Mu'tah is). The Prophet (according to this opinion) sent the army of Mu'tah to revenge the killing of his companions in Dhāt Aṭlāḥ.

The second opinion mentioned by Breik (2004: 249) was that this battle took place after the Prophet sent a message to the King of Buṣrā, who rejected it and threatened to send his army to fight the Muslims.

The researcher argues, on one hand, that the reason, mentioned by al-Wāqidī, contradicts the second opinion mentioned by Breik. Al-Wāqidī's argument shows that the messenger of the Prophet was killed before he reached the King of Buṣrā. This means that the message of the Prophet did not reach the King. In addition, there is no evidence from any historical source to show that the message of the Prophet was delivered to the King of Buṣrā. To the contrary, almost all of the historians and the scholars of *sīrah* and *ḥadīth* agree that the messenger of the Prophet to the King of Buṣrā was killed by Shuraḥbīl bin 'Amr al-Ghassānī. So, the second opinion stated by Breik may not be acceptable.

⁷ This was mentioned by Ibn Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī (d. 852 A.H.) in his book '*al-Iṣābah fī Tamayīz al-Ṣaḥābah*' (1978: (3) 301), while most other historians and scholars of *sīrah* and *ḥadīth* mention that Dhāt Aṭlāḥ is in al-Shām (historical Syria) only. The researcher argues that it is clear that al-Balqā' is a part of al-Shām, and so the opinion of Ibn Ḥajar is accepted since it narrows down the region and gives the exact site of Dhāt Aṭlāḥ.



On the other hand, the researcher argues that both the opinion of al-Wāqidī and the first opinion mentioned by Briek, have a very important similarity; both considered “Revenge” the direct reason for the battle of Mu’tah.

The researcher also argues that revenge for killing the messenger of the Prophet could be considered as one of the reasons for the battle, although al-Wāqidī did not mention the date of this incident. Furthermore, most of the scholars, who have mentioned this incident, have depended only on al-Wāqidī’s narration; al-‘Asqalānī for example (1978: (1) 286). Al-Ṭabarī (d. 310 A.H.) did not mention this incident when he spoke about sending the messages of the Prophet to the kings and leaders of the world at that time, which happened in the 6th year A.H. right after the treaty of *al-Ḥudaybiyah* (See al-Ṭabarī 1998: (3) 137), while the battle of Mu’tah happened almost in the middle of the 8th year A.H..

It seems reasonable to say that the direct incident that caused the battle of Mu’tah was the murder of 14 out of 15 of the companions of the Prophet during a mission to Dhāt Aṭlāḥ in al-Balqā’, since the two events took place very close to each other⁸. At the same time, one should connect the two incidents to examine why the Prophet sent the mission to Dhāt Aṭlāḥ. According to al-Wāqidī (1966: (2) 752), the mission to Dhāt Aṭlāḥ was to invite the people of that area to Islam. This shows that it was not a military mission, but evidence that the Prophet had a vision and an intention to spread Islam in that region in particular. There are no records of sending missions to spread Islam in Iraq for example, which was at that time under Persian rule, although the Persian Empire

⁸ The mission to Dhāt Aṭlāḥ took place in the third month of the year 8 A.H., which means only 2 months before the battle of Mu’tah (See al-Wāqidī 1966: (2) 752).



was then generally weak.⁹ Therefore, the researcher argues that it could be claimed that the main reason for the battle of Mu'tah might be to take revenge on the killers of the 14 companions of the Prophet, depending on the closeness of the incident of Dhāt Aṭlāh to the battle of Mu'tah, as opposed to the other reasons mentioned by some scholars.

The researcher adds another important element to understanding the reason for the battle of Mu'tah; al-Wāqidī (1966: (2) 757) stated that the Prophet ordered the army of Mu'tah to invite the people of the new territories to Islam or the *Jizyah*¹⁰ before fighting them. This shows that the main aim of the army might not have been revenge, otherwise, he would not have ordered them to invite others to Islam as happened in other previous military missions for example (See al-Ṭabarī 1998: (3) 152).

Moreover, the researcher argues that, while this reason (the killing of the delegation of the Prophet) could be taken as a direct one for the battle, this does not exclude the indirect reasons that urged the Prophet to send the biggest army that the Muslims had at that time to such a battle, knowing – as a political leader – the great danger behind this choice, not forgetting the situation in that region at that time; the Byzantine were the allies of Shuraḥbīl, and any clash with him would mean a clash with the Byzantine Empire. For the Byzantine Empire was

⁹ The researcher came to this conclusion after studying the general circumstances and events that occurred in the region between the Byzantines and the Persians at that time.

¹⁰ The tax that is taken from the People of the Book (the Jews and Christians) in the Muslim state in order to protect them and for them to become a part of the state.



at its peak after its great victory in *al-Shām* and its defeat of the Persians, excluding them from Islamic Jerusalem.¹¹

Thus, by connecting all the circumstances in which the battle happened, in addition to the political situation of the state in Madīnah, one can conclude that the battle of Mu'tah was the taking of the opportunity to start a military campaign to conquer Islamic Jerusalem. This leads to the argument that the Prophet had made a strategic plan towards conquering Islamic Jerusalem, and had begun to apply it with the battle of Mu'tah.

In other words, the researcher argues that the Prophet was involved in various circumstances that helped him to start sending Muslim missions to the land of *al-Shām* and, when the incident of killing 14 of his delegation to that region occurred, he took the opportunity to send an army to start a military campaign to conquer that region, which is the main gate to Islamic Jerusalem. It seems that this army was the one to explore the road to that region, which statement can be supported by studying the destination of the army, i.e. Mu'tah.

1.4 The destination:

Mu'tah is a town situated today in the south east of the Kingdom of Jordan, near al-Karak, which is one of the main cities in the south (See the map).

¹¹ It was well known that Heraclius defeated the Persians and conquered Islamic Jerusalem at that time, and the letter of the Prophet was delivered to him in Jerusalem, during his visit to Jerusalem as thanksgiving for the victory. The evidence is the well-known narration from Abū Sufiān when he was in Jerusalem and he was invited to meet Heraclius after he had received the letter of the Prophet, and Heraclius asked Abū Sufiān several questions about the Prophet. (See al-Bukhārī 1985: (1) 7)




Figure 1: The location of Mu'tah¹²

Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī (d. 626 A.H.) said in *Mu'jam al-Buldān*: “Mu'tah is one of the towns of al-Balqā' on the borders of *al-Shām*”¹³ (Yāqūt, n.d.: (5) 254). Al-‘Asqalānī said: “Ibn Ishāq said: It is near al-Balqā', and others said: it is situated two *Marḥalahs*¹⁴ away from *Bayt al-Maqdis*¹⁵” (al-‘Asqalānī 1997: (7) 639).

According to al-Maqdisī (d. 390 A.H.) in his book *Aḥsan al-Taqāsīm fī Ma'rifat al-Aqālīm*, the boundaries of the region of *Bayt al-Maqdis* (the region of Islamic Jerusalem) extends from the city of Jerusalem **up to forty miles**.

Khalid El-Awaisi studied this hypothesis (including calculating the equivalent to the ‘mile’ according to al-Maqdisī) and concluded that the boundaries of

¹² Global Gazetteer: <http://www.fallingrain.com/world/JO/9/Mutah.html>, seen on 30th June 2005.

¹³ Al-Qizwīnī also quoted al-Jīhānī the same fact about Mu'tah (See al-Qizwīnī n.d.: 275)

¹⁴ A measuring unit used at that time. The researcher does not state its equivalent today since this is not important to this study.

¹⁵ It seems clear in the text of al-‘Asqalānī that when he stated the terminology *Bayt al-Maqdis* he meant the city of Jerusalem at that time.



Islamic Jerusalem according to al-Maḳḳisī extended to reach Mu'tah on the borders as can be seen in the following map (Khalid 2003: 59).




Figure 2: The extents of the boundaries of Islamic Jerusalem according to al-Maḳḳisī

This gives a very important significance to the relationship between the battle of Mu'tah and Islamic Jerusalem. However, a question might be raised here: did the Prophet order the army to go to Mu'tah in particular or was this only a coincidence? Al-Ya'qūbī (d. 284 A.H.) (n.d.: (2) 72) and Ibn Kathīr (d. 774 A.H.) (n.d.: (3) 455) mentioned that the Prophet sent Ja'far bin Abī Tālib, Zaid bin Ḥārithah, and 'Abdullah bin Rawāḥah to al-Balqā' in *al-Shām*, and they were killed in Mu'tah.



However, al-Wāqidī's narration of the battle of Mu'tah gives an implication that the Prophet aimed to send an army to Mu'tah, since it was the place where his messenger was killed by Shuraḥbīl bin 'Amr al-Ghassānī (See al-Wāqidī 1966: (2) 755). While al-Bakrī (d. 487 A.H.) in his book '*Mu'jam Mastu'jim*' (1998: (1) 92) claimed that the Prophet sent the army to Ubnah¹⁶, and the three leaders of this army were killed in Mu'tah.

The researcher argues that it seems logical that the Prophet did not order the army to go to Mu'tah in particular; Ibn Ishāq (d. 151 A.H.) mentioned that the Muslims 'went forward until they were on the borders of the Balqā' when the Greeks¹⁷ and Arab forces of Heraclius met them at a village called Mashārif. When the enemy approached the Muslims withdrew to a village called Mu'tah' (See Guillaume 1955: 534). This text shows that the Muslims did not stop in Mu'tah, but continued marching north until they met the Byzantines in Mashārif.

Mashārif is situated to the north east of Mu'tah; the researcher searched the names of the towns around Mu'tah today and found the location of the town "al-Mushayrifah" which is the only town around Mu'tah that has a name close to Mashārif that was mentioned by Ibn Ishāq; the location of this town can be seen in the following map.

¹⁶ A full account of this town and its location will be presented in the 3rd chapter of this study, since it is connected to the *Ba'th* (mission) of Usāmah bin Zaid.

¹⁷ The researcher could not find the Arabic text of the *sīrah* of Ibn Ishāq, the only text that the researcher found was a translation of the *sīrah* of Ibn Ishāq written by A. Guillaume. The translator mentioned "Greeks" rather than the Byzantines or the Romans, but most of the scholars who quoted Ibn Ishāq mentioned "*al-Rūm*" which can be translated into "the Romans" or "the Byzantines".




Figure 3: The location of the town of al-Mushayrifah (Mashārif at the time of the battle of Mu'tah)¹⁸

Going back to al-Maqqdisī's boundaries of Islamic Jerusalem, it seems that the Muslims actually entered the Islamic Jerusalem region, and that their destination was in fact within Islamic Jerusalem. This gives a special importance to the battle of Mu'tah; it shows that this battle was in fact related to Islamic Jerusalem and was one of the main practical steps towards conquering it, especially in that it happened almost on the borders of Islamic Jerusalem as mentioned above.

1.5 Other facts of the battle of Mu'tah:

Briek mentioned something very interesting; in this battle, the Prophet named three leaders of the Muslim army for the first time in his life (see Breik 2004: 265). The researcher argues that such a nomination was not only due to the

¹⁸ Global Gazetteer: http://www.fallingrain.com/world/JO/9/Al_Mushayrifah.html, seen on 30th June 2005.



great dangers that surrounded the Muslim army (since it was the first battle outside the Arab Peninsula), there was also a specific significance in the nomination of these names in particular.

When the researcher studied the names of the three Muslim leaders of this battle (Zaid bin Ḥārithah, Ja‘far bin Abī Ṭālib, and ‘Abdullah bin Rawāḥah), he found that they represented the main three components of Muslim society in Madīnah at that time: the migrants from Makkah were represented by Zaid bin Ḥārithah, the original residents of Madīnah (*al-Anṣār*) were represented by ‘Abdullah bin Rawāḥah, and the family of the Prophet himself (*Āl al-Bayt*) were represented by Ja‘far bin Abī Ṭālib. The researcher believes that this has a very important significance. It seems that the Prophet wanted the leaders of this army in particular to represent all the main components of Muslims in Madīnah (the capital of the Muslim state at that time); this seems to be due to the uniqueness of the region where they were going. This would plant in Muslim thinking the seed that Islamic Jerusalem belonged to all of them, and that all of them must work together towards it. Therefore, it was as if ambassadors representing all types of Muslims were being sent there.

Another important fact is that the Muslim army to Mu’tah did not include many names of the greatest companions of the Prophet, such as Abū Bakr, ‘Umar bin al-Khaṭṭāb, ‘Uthmān bin ‘Affān, ‘Ali bin Abi Ṭālib and others (see Breik 2004: 267).



The researcher argues that this was due to the nature of that battle; it was **not** obligatory like some other missions occurring during the lifetime of the Prophet. The researcher sees significance here; the devoiding from the army many great names of the companions gives an implication that Islamicjerusalem was to be protected by all Muslims, regardless of their seniority in Islam. In addition, it was noticed that the army of Mu'tah included many names of new Muslims like Khālid bin al-Walīd and Abū Hurairah. This could be significant, i.e. the new Muslims were the first step towards conquering that region, since they did not pray towards it like the senior Muslims.¹⁹ Therefore, they needed a strong connection with the region. It must be observed that most of the soldiers of the armies that conquered Islamicjerusalem at the time of 'Umar bin al-Khaṭṭāb were new Muslims.

1.6 The result of the battle:

The result of this battle was not a definite victory for the Muslims and not even for the Byzantines, although some historians stated that Muslims defeated the Byzantines like Ibn Kathīr (n.d.: (3) 473), and others said that the Byzantines defeated Muslims like al-Wāqidī (1966: (2) 764). Other scholars such as Ibn Ishāq and Ibn Hishām (d. 218 A.H.) have not given a clear opinion on the outcome of the battle.

¹⁹ The researcher argues that the *Qiblah* was changed a short time after the migration of the Prophet to Medina after about 14 years of Praying towards Islamicjerusalem, enough time for the first Muslims to understand the importance of Islamicjerusalem; this was not offered to the new Muslims at that time. However, the issue of changing the *Qiblah* and its significances needs further study and discussion to find the relationship between Makkah and Islamicjerusalem in the light of praying towards both of them.



The researcher does not agree with the first two opinions; since when anyone studies the events of this battle and compares it with others that happened before and after it, they find there many clear signs of victory and defeat, like war prisoners, booties, etc. However, none of these signs were present here, except for booties taken by some Muslims mentioned by Ibn Kathīr (Ibn Kathīr (n.d.): (3) 471). Hence, it might not be fully accurate to claim that either the Byzantines or the Muslims were defeated.

The Prophet himself gave his own conclusion on the battle's result when, defending the army of Mu'tah after some of the people of Madīnah claimed that they had escaped from the battle, he said: 'They are not escapers, they are to turn around and resume fighting if it pleases Allāh' (Ibn Hishām 1998: 216). When he was in Madīnah, the prophet told the companions of what was happening in the area of the battle as al-Bukhārī narrated:

“Zaid took the flag, and he was hit (i.e. killed), then Ja‘far took it and he was hit, and then Ibn Rawāḥa took it and he was hit – and his eyes were shedding tears – until one of God’s swords took the flag, and God supported them²⁰.”

²⁰ أخذ زيد الراية فأصيب، ثم أخذ جعفر فأصيب، ثم أخذ ابن رواحة فأصيب – وعيناه تذر فان – حتى أخذ الراية سيف من سيف الله عليهم. (al-‘Asqalānī 1997: (6) 21)

The Arabic concept فتح الله عليهم means some kind of being victorious, but it cannot be translated into (render victory). Thus, it is a kind of victory different to that known in battles generally, and the Prophet may have used this concept to describe the situation as being not a complete victory as it was well known.



1.7 The Significance of the Battle of Mu'tah:

Ibn Kathīr held an interesting opinion concerning the significance of the battle of Mu'tah in general; he said: 'This invasion was a sign of the forthcoming Muslim invasion of the Romans²¹' (Ibn Kathīr 2001: (1) 140)²². The researcher agrees with Ibn Kathīr in his understanding of the significance of this battle as being a sign and a start of the forthcoming conquest of *al-Shām*.

In addition, the researcher argues that the Prophet used the expression 'they are to turn around and resume fighting' when he described the Muslim army after they returned from Mu'tah; this indicates the real purpose of the battle, which for the military campaign to conquer that region was only a starting point. The researcher argues that the Prophet – by stating this – had opened the gate for the next steps towards that region, and had given a hint for Muslims about the upcoming events. In other words, this battle was the introduction of all that was to happen later on. That is, the conquest of Islamic Jerusalem, since it was the first practical examination of the road to Islamic Jerusalem, and the first examination of the force that was situated in Islamic Jerusalem at that time, the Byzantines. In addition, one of the most important results of this battle was that it gave the Muslims an international reputation; they were the only nation that had dared to challenge the Byzantine Empire, which was the victorious Empire

²¹ Meaning the conquest of *al-Shām*.

²² This book is different from the Arabic book of Ibn Kathīr (*al-Sīrah al-Nabawīyyah*) which was edited by Muṣṭafā 'Abd al-Wāḥid; the latter was only a part of the book of Ibn Kathīr (*al-Bidāyah wa al-Nihāyah*). The editor took only those parts of that book in which Ibn Kathīr spoke about the Prophet's biography. However, the book mentioned here is another that was written by Ibn Kathīr, specialising only in the *sīrah* of the Prophet. In other words, Ibn Kathīr wrote two books: one about the *sīrah* of the Prophet (which is this book), and one about the general history (which is the book edited by 'Abd al-Wāḥid). Both were used in this study since Ibn Kathīr had stated different arguments and opinions in each of them.



at that time since they had defeated the Persians and expelled them from Islamicjerusalem and *al-Shām* in the year 7 A.H.²³

Thus, by looking at all the circumstances that surrounded this battle, the importance of the battle as a first practical Muslim (as a nation) step towards Islamicjerusalem can be understood.

The researcher argues that Mu'tah was indeed essential in preparing for conquering Islamicjerusalem. Without Mu'tah, the Muslims would not have been able to examine this road and investigate the strength of their enemy, i.e. the Byzantines, which might have delayed the conquest of Islamicjerusalem. The battle can be considered as not only being an important practical step taken by the Prophet towards Islamicjerusalem, but also the first.

²³ This has been studied further by Hānī Abū al-Rub in his book *Tārīkh Filisṭīn* (See Hānī 2002: 88).



1.8 Conclusion:

It can be thus concluded that the Prophet sent the Muslim army to Mu'tah as a first practical step of the conquest of Islamicjerusalem; this may be seen by looking at the location of Mu'tah on the borders of Islamicjerusalem (according to al-Maqdisī's hypothesis of the boundaries of Islamicjerusalem), the orders of the Prophet to the army to first invite the people in that region to Islam, and his comment on the result of the battle when he clearly stated that the Muslims would turn around and resume fighting.

This shows that the Prophet used the battle of Mu'tah to examine the road to Islamicjerusalem, and to find out the strength and the methods that the Byzantines used in fighting. This gives the battle of Mu'tah its huge importance in the conquering of Islamicjerusalem. Finally, regarding Bayḍūn's argument that the Prophet in this battle was aiming at *al-Shām*, the researcher concluded that although there is not a big gap between Bayḍūn's argument and his own, the researcher sees that the Prophet's interest in this region was most likely due to the presence of Islamicjerusalem in it, which can be seen by studying the location of Mu'tah and its relationship to Islamicjerusalem. This will be more elaborated on and proved by connecting the findings of this battle with other incidents, especially when studying the *Ghazwah* to Tabūk and the *Ba'th* of Usāmah bin Zaid, in the following chapters.



Chapter Two

The *Ghazwah* of Tabūk (9 A.H. - 630 C.E.)

2.1 Introduction:

During the lifetime of Prophet Muhammad, a number of vital *Ghazwahs* occurred, which had a very important impact on Muslim history. In this chapter, the researcher will shed light on one of the most important incidents at that time, namely the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk. Throughout the study, the researcher will investigate and examine the accuracy of the claim that Prophet Muhammad went to this *Ghazwah* as part of a plan and as a practical step to conquer Islamic Jerusalem.

2.2 The uniqueness of the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk:

When dealing with an important *Ghazwah* like Tabūk, an important question arises; what are the factors that help someone understand the importance and uniqueness of the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk?

To examine this question, it should be noted that Tabūk was: Firstly, the last *Ghazwah* during the lifetime of the Prophet. Secondly, this was far and away the longest *Ghazwah* and the longest trip that the Prophet made during his Prophethood. Thirdly, this *Ghazwah* was the only one in which the Prophet publicly announced its direction to his companions from the start; it was usually his habit to keep the destination of any *Ghazwah* secret and indicate to the people



that he wanted to go to another direction, as part of his military strategy. In this *Ghazwah*, however, he clarified the case to the Muslims from the beginning, and told them that his aim was the Byzantines. The timing of this *Ghazwah* was critical (in the middle of summer), and the place was very far towards the north of the Arab Peninsula, as many scholars of *sīrah* like Ibn Hishām have mentioned (1987: (4) 155-156).

The importance and uniqueness of this *Ghazwah* can also be understood by noting the strong orders of the Prophet to the Muslims to go for this *Ghazwah*, making it obligatory on all the Muslims at that time except those with serious excuses. All the Muslims participated in this *Ghazwah* except for three companions, and they were boycotted for fifty days until forgiveness was revealed in the Qur’ān (9:117-118); their story is mentioned in all the books of *sīrah* (See Ibn Hishām 1987: (4) 173-179). This boycotting is the main evidence of the obligatory nature of this *Ghazwah*.

2.3 The reasons for the *Ghazwah*:

The first major question in this chapter is how are we to understand the reasons for this *Ghazwah*?

It was noticed that most of the scholars who have spoken on the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk did not specify a major event that could have triggered this *Ghazwah*. Ibn Ishāq (Guillaume 1955: 602) and Ibn Hishām (1987: (3) 155) did not mention any specific reason for this *Ghazwah*. They just mentioned the start of the



Ghazwah without specifying a direct reason, as occurs in most of the previous *Ghazwahs* of the Prophet. Does this mean that Ibn Ishāq and Ibn Hishām claimed that the Prophet did not have a specific reason or cause for this *Ghazwah*? The researcher argues that Ibn Ishāq and Ibn Hishām, not mentioning a specific reason for the *Ghazwah*, does not mean that the Prophet did not have an aim or reason behind it, since it cannot be understood that the Prophet would have gone into battle without an aim, plan or reason. This one contradicted his previous *Ghazwahs* and battles, which were specified by a direct reason, which can be discovered and proved by reading the opinions of the *sīrah* and *ḥadīth* scholars on the Prophet’s previous *Ghazwahs* and military missions after his migration to Madīnah.

Thus, the researcher argues that this *Ghazwah* – with special reference to its unique nature – must have had a strong reason that led the Prophet to march all the way from Madīnah to Tabūk. Some scholars have tried to elaborate on and find the possible main reason for the *Ghazwah*.

Al-Ya‘qūbī said a reason put forward was that the Prophet ordered the Muslims to march towards Tabūk in order to revenge his cousin Ja‘far bin Abī Ṭālib’s killing during the battle of Mu’tah (al-Ya‘qūbī (n.d.): (2) 67). The researcher argues that this reason may not be considered accurate since it contains no evidence from the sayings or the acts of the Prophet before and through the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk.

Ibn Kathīr held another interesting opinion on the reason for this *Ghazwah*:



Narrated from Ibn ‘Abbās ... and others: when Allāh ordered that the polytheists must be prohibited from visiting al-Ḥarām mosque (in Makkah) during pilgrimage or any other occasion, Quraysh²⁴ said: Now all the markets and trades during the pilgrimage will be stopped, thus, we will lose what we used to gain from them. Therefore, Allāh compensated them by ordering them to fight the people of the book until they become Muslims or pay the *Jizyah*. I (Ibn Kathīr) said: so, the Prophet determined to fight the Byzantines, since they were the closest to him, and the first that deserved to be invited for the truth since they were the closest to Islam and Muslims.²⁵

The researcher argues that this analysis of Ibn Kathīr is very interesting, but at the same time it cannot be accepted for different reasons. Firstly, the researcher could not find any relationship between the narration that Ibn Kathīr mentioned (from Ibn ‘Abbās and others) and the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk. The researcher understood from this narration that the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk was a kind of distraction of the people of Makkah from what they expected (as the narration mentioned), and this is unacceptable. Also the army of this *Ghazwah* did not only contain the people of Makkah, the *Ghazwah* contained thirty thousand soldiers from different tribes and places.

In addition, the researcher argues that the closest to the Muslim land at that time were Iraq, Yemen and Abyssinia (not the Byzantines), and most of them were not Muslims at that time. Moreover, we should not forget that the Byzantines were considered much stronger at that time than the Persians, especially after

²⁴ The tribe that was in Makkah, which is the tribe of the Prophet.

²⁵ روي عن ابن عباس ومجاهد وعكرمة وسعيد بن جبير وقتادة والضحاك وغيرهم: أنه لما أمر الله تعالى بأن يُمنع المشركون من قربان المسجد الحرام في الحج وغيره، قالت قريش: لتنقطعن عنا المتاجر والأسواق أيام الحج وليذهبن ما كنا نصيب منها. فعرضهم الله عن ذلك بالأمر بقتال أهل الكتاب حتى يسلموا أو يعطوا الجزية عن يد وهم صاغرون. قلت: فعزم رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم على قتال الروم لأنهم أقرب الناس إليه وأولى الناس بالدعوة إلى الحق لقربهم من الإسلام وأهله.

(Ibn Kathīr (n.d.): (4) 3)



they defeated the Persians and expelled them from *al-Shām* (Historical Syria). Therefore, it would have been easier for the Prophet either to go to Iraq, Yemen or Abyssinia which were the closest (especially Iraq and Yemen, since there were no seas between them and the Muslims like Abyssinia) or fight the Persians who were getting weaker at that time. So, the researcher argues that the reasons that Ibn Kathīr mentioned were not sufficient.

Some scholars have mentioned other specific reasons for this *Ghazwah* like al-Wāqidī, who stated:

The Prophet heard that the Byzantines had gathered a great army in *al-Shām*, and that Heraclius gave his companions (of what was enough) for a year (i.e. spent a large amount of money on this army), and Lakham, Jidhām, ‘Āmilah and Ghassān had come with him (Heraclius), and that they brought the front of their armies to *al-Balqā’* (al-Wāqidī 1966: (3) 990)

Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 751 A.H.) agreed with al-Wāqidī as he quoted Ibn Sa‘d (d. 230 A.H.) (Ibn al-Qayyim 1989: (3) 3). However, the researcher argues that, though this narration seems very logical, it does not have any supportive narration connected to the Prophet (since it speaks of an incident that occurred in the lifetime of the Prophet). Therefore, though it cannot be considered the main reason,²⁶ it might be taken as a possible reason, especially since no other scholar has mentioned it.

²⁶ The researcher argues that dealing with the events and the acts of the Prophet himself cannot be accepted generally without referring to narrations, since the acts of the Prophet are considered the second primary source in Islam, and so should be dealt with differently from other historical materials and narrations.



On the other hand, Al-Mubarakpuri tried to elaborate on this issue in order to find the specific reason for this *Ghazwah*; he stated that the main reason for the *Ghazwah* was that there was a serious threat made against Madīnah by the king of the Arab-Ghassanides²⁷, and caused by the battle of Mu'tah in the year 7 A.H. (al-Mubarakpuri 1996: 422-424). Al-Mubarakpuri depended on a *ḥadīth* narrated in al-Bukhārī's (d. 256 A.H.) *Sahīḥ* from 'Umar bin al-Khaṭṭāb. The *ḥadīth* speaks about the incident where the Prophet was separated from his wives for some time and the Muslims thought that he had divorced them all; in this narration 'Umar said:

...And (during that time) all who were around the messenger of Allāh (i.e. the tribes) surrendered to him, so no one was left except the king of the Ghassanides in *al-Shām*, whom we were afraid would come and attack us. I ('Umar) did not feel the presence of anyone when one of the *Anṣār* came to me (i.e. suddenly) saying: "something has happened!" I said: "what is it? Did the Ghassanide come?" He said: "No, it's greater than this! The messenger of Allāh has divorced his wives". So I came...²⁸

This *ḥadīth* shows – according to al-Mubarakpuri – that the Muslims in Madīnah were considered under threat of the Ghassanides at that period when the incident of the Prophet and his wives occurred.

The researcher agrees that this reason mentioned by al-Mubarakpuri might not be considered **the main and only reason** for the *Ghazwah*, since there is disagreement among the scholars as to which happened first: the *Ghazwah* of

²⁷ The Arab-Ghassanides were the rulers of a part of *al-Shām*, and were allied with the Byzantine Empire, they used to have their own kings, but the Byzantines ruled them indirectly (See al-Mubarakpuri 1996: 27).

²⁸ وكان من حول رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم قد استقام له فلم يبق إلا ملك غسان بالشأم كنا نخاف أن يأتينا فما شعرت إلا بالأنصاري وهو يقول إنه قد حدث أمر قلت له وما هو أجاز الغساني قال أعظم من ذلك طلق رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم نساءه فجئت... (al-Bukhārī 1987: (5) 2197)



Tabūk or the incident of the Prophet and his wives. Some of the scholars claim that the incident of the Prophet with his wives did not happen before the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk.²⁹

²⁹ In fact, the books of *sīrah* generally do not mention this incident (of the Prophet and his wives). But disagreement was raised due to the disagreement about the ordering of the revelation of the verses of the Qur’ān commenting on the incident of the Prophet and his wives, and whether it was revealed before or after Tabūk.

In the Qur’ān: chapter 66 (al-Taḥrīm) was revealed – according to some scholars – after the incident of the Prophet and his wives, which was considered the reason for the revelation of this chapter. Al-Naysābūrī (d. 468 A.H.) – for example – was one of the scholars who claimed this (al-Naysābūrī (n.d.): 243-245).

According to that opinion, this chapter was revealed after chapter 49 (al-Ḥujūrāt) (See Darwazah 2000: (8) 529), which was revealed because of the incident of the delegation of *Banī Tamīm*, whose story was mentioned in the *sīrah* of Ibn Hishām. Ibn Hishām said that the incident of the delegation of *Banī Tamīm* occurred after the Prophet had finished the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk (See Ibn Hishām 1987: (4) 203). However, it might be confusing to find that Darwazah in his *Tafsīr* put chapter 9 (al-Tawbah) that spoke about the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk after chapters 49 and 66, but the researcher argues that this can be understood when Darwazah argued that the chapter 9 was revealed different times (Darwazah 2000: (9) 328) before, during and after the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk. Therefore this chapter might have ended a while after the ending of the revelation of both chapters 49 and 66, and because of that it was organised in the *Tafsīr* of Darwazah after them.

The researcher, after this study, concludes that the incident mentioned in the narration of ‘Umar could not be considered as the main reason for Tabūk (as al-Mubarakpuri argued), because of the disagreement of whether it happened before or after the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk. At the same time, the researcher argues that this reason could be considered one of the reasons for the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk, depending on the narration of al-Bukhārī, which could be considered as one of the reasons, since it is not entirely clear whether it happened before or after Tabūk. The researcher argues that we must not forget that the disagreement between the scholars in this case makes it possible that either side could be right.

On the other hand, if we go to the books of *Tafsīr*, we find that some of the scholars have tried to link the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk and a verse in the Qur’ān in chapter 17, verse 76:

وإن كانوا ليستفزونك من الأرض ليخرجوك منها وإن لا يلبثون خلافاً إلا قليلاً (17:76)

And they endeavour to estrange thee from the land with a view to driving thee away from it – but, then, after thou wilt have left, they themselves will not remain (in it) for more than a little while (17:76)

(The researcher has taken from the translation some words that the translator (asad 2003: 479) added to the text that showed his own opinion in some disagreements among scholars, as in the case of (which land) for example, since he stated in his translation “from the land (of your birth)...”. Here there was disagreement among the scholars, since some said that the land was Madīnah, not Makkah, so the researcher has stated the exact phrases of the translation that do not have disagreements).

Although chapter 17 is a Makkkan chapter (meaning that it was revealed before the Prophet’s migration to Madīnah), it is said by some scholars like al-Ṭabarī (1999: (8) 121), Ibn Kathīr (1994: (3) 74) and al-Qurṭubī (d. 671 A.H.) (1998: (5) 270) that this verse in particular was revealed in Tabūk (which means that this verse in particular is a Madanian verse, i.e. was revealed after the migration of the Prophet). They depended on a narration of al-Ṣuyūṭī that can be found following in this study.



However, al-Şuyūṭī (d. 911 A.H.) in his book *Lubāb al-Nuqūl* mentioned a very interesting narration regarding the reason for the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk; he said:

Narrated by ‘Abd al-Raḥmān bin Ghunm: the Jews came to the Prophet and said: if you are a Prophet, then go to *al-Shām*, since *al-Shām* is the land of gathering and the land of the Prophets. The Prophet believed what they said, so, he went for the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk intending *al-Shām*. When he arrived in Tabūk, Allāh revealed to him some verses from the chapter of *al-Isrā’* (chapter 17) after its revelation was finished.³⁰

This narration is weak as al-Şuyūṭī himself argued after mentioning it (al-Şuyūṭī (n.d.): 277). Therefore, it cannot be considered reliable; in any case, al-Şuyūṭī mentioned that there are other similar weak narrations that can strengthen this narration.

The researcher argues that these other narrations are also weak. Thus, although they could be used to support an argument, they may not be able to be used to build an argument, as they are not reliable. Furthermore, it was noticed that Ibn Kathīr, when he mentioned this narration in his *Tafsīr*, rejected it totally, not depending on it to find out the possible reason for the *Ghazwah*; the researcher agrees with him in his not relying on this narration. However, the researcher still argues that this narration can be used to support an opinion without depending on it as evidence, as there are other similar supportive weak narrations, and these narrations could strengthen it.

³⁰ من حديث شهر بن حوشب عن عبد الرحمن بن غنم، أن اليهود أتوا النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم فقالوا: إن كنت نبياً فالحق بالشام، فإن الشام أرض المحشر وأرض الأنبياء. فصدق رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم ما قالوا، فغزا غزوة تبوك يريد الشام. فلما بلغ تبوك أنزل الله آيات من سورة الإسراء بعد ما ختمت (وإن كادوا ليستفزونك من الأرض ليخرجوك منها) (al-Şuyūṭī (n.d.): 276)



Moreover, the researcher has mentioned the opinions of both Ibn Kathīr and al-Mubarakpuri and clarified his disagreement with them, and stated his opinion in the narration of al-Şuyūfī. He argues that the main possible reason for this *Ghazwah* was not clarified by any strong evidence; this opens the gate to further debate on connecting the link of the events of this *Ghazwah* to try to find a possible main reason. However, the researcher could not see any actual threat posed by the Byzantines over Madīnah that could be argued as being the main reason for the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk.

The researcher argues that, in order to gain more understanding of the possible reason that motivated the Prophet to go for the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk, the choice of the place and some of the events that occurred during the *Ghazwah* should be studied thoroughly. The researcher will focus on two issues, namely, the choice of the town of Tabūk in particular, and one of the most important *ḥadīths* that the Prophet mentioned while he was in Tabūk that might give a vision of the main reason for the *Ghazwah*.

2.4 The choice of the area of Tabūk:

In the figure below, the site of Tabūk can be seen on the borders between *al-Shām* and the Arab Peninsula. It is the first big town that the traveller from Jordan to Saudi Arabia today reaches after the *Hālat ‘Ammār* borders checkpoint.



Figure 4: The location of Tabūk³¹

Regarding the choice of the town of Tabūk for the Muslim army to camp, the researcher could not find a specification in *sīrah* or *ḥadīth* sources, but he noticed that al-Suhailī (d. 581 A.H.) mentioned a different story for the reason why this *Ghazwah* was named Tabūk; he said:

The *Ghazwah* of Tabūk was named after the spring of Tabūk, which is the spring of water that the Prophet ordered the people (the Muslim army) not to touch (during the *Ghazwah*). Two men arrived before him while the spring was flowing with a little amount of water, and they put two arrows in it in order to let its water become more. Thus, when the Prophet arrived he scolded them and said: “you still *Tabūkānihā*!” so, the spring was called Tabūk, and “tabūk” means to dig in a thing. (al-Suhailī (n.d.): (4) 291)

The researcher argues that this reason for naming the *Ghazwah* “Tabūk” was not mentioned except by al-Suhailī. Although the story of the spring was mentioned in many other books of *sīrah*, no one claimed that this was the reason for naming this *Ghazwah*. The researcher argues that the story could be taken into consideration when studying the reason for naming the place Tabūk as other

³¹ Maps Online: <http://mapmachine.nationalgeographic.com/> seen on 17th April 2005



scholars have also mentioned, like Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, but the narration of the spring should not be considered as a reason for naming all the *Ghazwah* after it.

Thus, it seems that the area where the town of Tabūk is (today) was not called “Tabūk” until the Prophet camped in it during this *Ghazwah*. This town was mentioned by scholars of geography in many cases, for example, Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī:

Tabūk: a place between *Wādī al-Qurā* (the region to the north of Madīnah) and *al-Shām*, and it was said that this is (a name of) a pool for the sons of Sa‘d of the tribe of Banī ‘Udhrah. Abū Zaid said: Tabūk is between *al-Ḥijr* (a region south of Tabūk) and the beginning of *al-Shām*.³²

It seems clear that Tabūk is not considered a part of *al-Shām*, but as being on the borders of the *al-Shām* region. The researcher argues that this has a very important meaning in the study of the relationship between this *Ghazwah* and Islamic Jerusalem. The Prophet did not enter *al-Shām* although he sent troops to some places inside *al-Shām* and held treaties with some of the tribes and towns there as scholars such as Ibn Ḥibbān (d. 254 A.H.) have mentioned (Ibn Ḥibbān 2000: 271-273).

The researcher sees a very important significance in the fact that the Prophet did not enter *al-Shām*; if the Prophet went to this *Ghazwah* in order to fight the Byzantines or the Ghassanides, he would have entered their land, of which *al-Shām* is a part. Also, *al-Shām* was definitely known to the Prophet as the land of

³² تبوك: موضع بين وادي القرى والشام، وقيل بركة لأبناء سعد من بني عذرة، وقال أبو زيد: تبوك بين الحجر وأول الشام. (Yāqūt (n.d.): (2) 17)



previous Prophets. Therefore, it seems sensible that he would have entered the region **if he were eager to fight**, as he would have encountered them in their lands. This is so, especially when we are unsure whether the area of Tabūk was inhabited at that time.³³ However, the researcher argues that it is not important to know if Tabūk was inhabited town, since it will not make any difference to this case, as it is very clear from the *ḥadīths* that the Prophet was staying in his own tent.

A question is raised here: why did the Prophet choose Tabūk in which to camp and not choose to enter *al-Shām*? Could this mean that the Prophet knew that he would not enter the land of the Prophets and conquer Islamic Jerusalem in his lifetime, so he wanted to secure the road for the Muslims to conquer it afterwards? This can be seen when studying the authentic *ḥadīth* that the Prophet said in Tabūk while he was in his tent about conquering Islamic Jerusalem.

2.5 The *ḥadīth* of conquering Islamic Jerusalem:

Al-Bukhārī mentioned in his *al-Sahīḥ* book a *ḥadīth* that was said in Tabūk:

Narrated ‘Awf bin Mālīk: I came to the messenger of Allāh during the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk while he was in a small tent made of leather, he (the Prophet) said: count six things before the Day of Judgment: my death, then the conquest of *Bayt al-Maqdis*...³⁴

³³ The only one to mention that Tabūk was an inhabited town was al-Balādhurī (d. 279 A.H.), who claimed that the Prophet stayed in Tabūk for some days, and its inhabitants agreed with him to pay the *jizyah* (al-Balādhurī 1992: 69). However, the researcher argues that al-Balādhurī did not give any evidence or narration for this claim. Therefore, the researcher argues that this statement of al-Balādhurī is not reliable.

³⁴ حدثنا الحميدي حدثنا الوليد بن مسلم حدثنا عبد الله بن العلاء بن زبر قال سمعت بسر بن عبيد الله أنه سمع أبا إدريس قال سمعت عوف بن مالك قال: أتيت النبي في غزوة تبوك وهو في قبة من آدم فقال: اعدد ستا بين يدي الساعة: موتي ثم فتح بيت المقدس... (al-Bukhārī 1987: (3) 1159)



The most important part of the *ḥadīth* is that of “conquering *Bayt al-Maqdis*”. According to Abd al-Fattah El-Awaisi, the word *Bayt al-Maqdis* may be translated into English language as “Islamicjerusalem” (El-Awaisi: 2005: 8),³⁵ and the researcher argues that it could be used in this *ḥadīth* to refer to the region of Islamicjerusalem.

The researcher argues that it was in this *ḥadīth* that the Prophet **for the first time** in his life clearly mentioned “conquering Islamicjerusalem”. This gives a very important impression of the possible reason behind going to Tabūk. The Prophet had never mentioned conquering Islamicjerusalem before this *Ghazwah*. He used to mention the region or the al-Aqsa mosque in his *ḥadīths* with reference to the status and importance of this region for Muslims, but this was the first time ever that the Prophet had mentioned something practical about conquering that region, and this entails many interpretations.

The researcher adds another issue related to this *ḥadīth*; this *Ghazwah* came about one year after conquering Makkah and securing the *Ka’ba*, and this *ḥadīth* was said in Tabūk. Therefore, it could be argued that this gives a sense that the Prophet might have started a new practical stage of marching towards the third holiest place in Islam, which is Islamicjerusalem, right after he secured the first

³⁵ However, the researcher has done a short study on the case of translation of the two terminologies (Islamicjerusalem and *Bayt al-Maqdis*). He argues that he agrees with the argument of El-Awaisi though not in all the cases, since the terminology of *Bayt al-Maqdis* could refer to al-Aqsa Mosque, the city of Jerusalem, or the region of Islamicjerusalem. In this *ḥadīth* in particular, the researcher argues that the terminology *Bayt al-Maqdis* is not clear as to whether it refers to a mosque, a city, or a region, since it was open and general and, in the case of conquest, it could be argued that it is acceptable to consider *Bayt al-Maqdis* in this *ḥadīth* speaking about any one of the three (the mosque, the city, and the region), as the conquest could refer to all of the three elements. Hence, conquering the region means conquering the city and the mosque, and to conquer the mosque, they should secure the city and the region as well, i.e. conquer it. So, the researcher sees no difference in this case in particular.



important place, that is Makkah. It must be said that Islamicjerusalem was the first *qiblah* of the Muslims before praying towards the *Ka'ba* in Makkah (al-Ṭabarī 1998: (3) 17).

The researcher argues that there are several elements gathered together in this *Ghazwah*, and they point to Islamicjerusalem. Therefore, when one connects these links, one could conclude that the Prophet might have been preparing the Muslims practically for the next campaign to conquer the third most important site in Islam, i.e. Islamicjerusalem, and that Tabūk could be considered as one of the first practical steps made by the Prophet towards conquering Islamicjerusalem.

The researcher – after this study – argues that the first motivation for the Prophet to go to Tabūk was most likely something other than fighting the Byzantines; and by looking at the general status of Islamicjerusalem in Islam, it could be argued that the Prophet wanted the Muslims to get closer to the region in a military campaign, i.e. a practical preparation and exercise. This can be supported by the narrations of the Prophet and the Jews (that were mentioned earlier); although the researcher found that these narrations are weak in general. However, the researcher would like to draw attention to an important issue, which is that this analysis of the reason does not mean that the Prophet did not either take into consideration the danger of the Byzantines and their threat over Madīnah, or other motivations.



It could be argued that the Prophet had a major aim, and that he waited for the right circumstances to achieve it. When those circumstances were obtainable, he seized the chance and marched towards Islamic Jerusalem. This was not the first time that this occurred during the lifetime of the Prophet; it had happened before when he waited for appropriate circumstances to conquer Makkah, although he had the strength to do that earlier. But, when the right opportunity emerged, he marched towards the city and conquered it.

However, to say that the Prophet wanted to conquer Islamic Jerusalem himself might not be accurate; this can be ascertained by studying the *ḥadīth* that the Prophet said in Tabūk, about the conquest of Islamic Jerusalem **after** his death. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the Prophet might have wanted this *Ghazwah* to be a practical step and an initial practical campaign towards Islamic Jerusalem led by him. This can be more understood when studying the agreements and treaties that the Prophet reached in Tabūk with the northern tribes and cities, especially the treaty with the leader of Aylah³⁶ and the inhabitants of Adhruḥ and Jarbā'³⁷ (Ibn Ḥibbān 2000: 272). These treaties and documents should be thoroughly studied and analysed, especially a condition appearing in the treaty with the leader of Aylah, in which the Prophet stipulated what the people of Aylah should do. al-Wāqidī stated the text:³⁸

³⁶ The city of Aqaba today in the Kingdom of Jordan.

³⁷ These two towns still exist in the Kingdom of Jordan to the south of the city of Madaba.

³⁸ Al-Balādhurī did not mention the text of the treaty, but he mentioned that the Prophet put a condition on the people of Aylah that they would serve food to whoever passed through their land of Muslims (al-Balādhurī 1992: 69).



And they shall not prevent (anyone of the Muslims) from water, or a way that they need to pass through, whether this be on land or through sea.³⁹

The researcher argues that these conditions were very important in securing the road to Islamic Jerusalem; thus the applications of these conditions (and other circumstances that occurred in Tabūk) in the Muslim campaign to conquer Islamic Jerusalem during Abū Bakr and ‘Umar’s era should be studied thoroughly.

2.6 The significance of Tabūk during the conquest of Islamic Jerusalem:

After the death of Prophet Muhammad and the end of *Hurūb al-Riddah*,⁴⁰ the first caliph, Abū Bakr, launched a campaign to conquer Islamic Jerusalem and sent four armies from Madīnah.⁴¹ Three of these were ordered to take the route of Tabūk and the fourth was ordered to take the route of Aylah, on their way to *al-Shām*, as many scholars have mentioned such as al-Balādhurī (1992: 127) and al-Wāqidī (n.d.: 9). According to al-al-Ṭabarī, the only army that was ordered to take the route of Aylah was ‘Amr bin al-‘Āṣ (al-Ṭabarī 1998: (4) 53). The researcher argues that taking this route (which is longer than the route of Tabūk)

³⁹ وإنه لا يحل أن يمنعوا ماء يريدهونه ولا طريقاً يريدهونه من بر أو بحر (al-Wāqidī 1966: (3) 1031)

⁴⁰ This means the wars that were launched by Abū Bakr against the apostates who declared apostasy from Islam after the passing away of the Prophet.

⁴¹ There is disagreement among the historians as to the number of armies that Abū Bakr sent; while al-Balādhurī (1992: 126) claimed that the armies were only three, Abū al-Rub quoted Ibn A‘tham that Abū Bakr sent Abū ‘Ubaydah ‘Āmir bin al-Jarrāh with an army to conquer *Himaṣ* in *al-Shām* (Abū al-Rub 2002: 107).

Al-Balādhurī claimed that Abū ‘Ubaydah was not sent as a leader of any army. However, the researcher argues that, according to many other historians like al-Wāqidī (n.d.: 16) and al-Ṭabarī (1998: (4) 53), Abū ‘Ubaydah was one of the leaders of the armies who marched to *al-Shām*, and he was ordered to lead the whole armies until Khālīd bin al-Walīd was sent from Iraq to fight with the armies in *al-Shām* and was ordered to lead the armies instead of Abū ‘Ubaydah (See al-Wāqidī (n.d.): 24). Therefore, the researcher argues that the claim of al-Balādhurī is not acceptable



means that Abū Bakr was aware of the benefit of a treaty between the Prophet and the people of Aylah. Thus, taking this route would guarantee the needed supplies for the army before entering the southern parts of Palestine, which would then take the Muslim army along the nearest road to Islamic Jerusalem. This shows that the army of ‘Amr bin al-‘Āṣ was considered to be the most important army, and this can be proved by looking at a narration of al-Wāqidī, stating that when the army of ‘Amr bin al-‘Āṣ left Madīnah, ‘Uthmān bin ‘Affān noticed that Abū Bakr was sad. When asked the reason for this sadness, he replied: I fear for the Muslim armies, and I wish that Allāh would make them victorious. ‘Uthmān said:

By Allāh, I was not happy for any army that went out of Madīnah except for this army, because it is going to *al-Shām*, **and this is what Allāh has ordered his Prophet.**⁴²

The researcher argues that ‘Uthmān’s statement shows that the army of ‘Amr bin al-‘Āṣ was considered one of the most important armies in the Muslim campaign towards conquering Islamic Jerusalem; this shows the great benefit of the treaty between the Prophet and the people of Aylah, as well as the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk during the lifetime of the Prophet as a whole, and its great effect on the Muslim campaign during the rule of Abū Bakr.

In addition, one must not forget that specifying the Tabūk route in particular for three armies out of four has its own significance; choosing the same route that the Prophet took during the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk can be considered a completion

⁴² (والله ما خرج جيش سررت به إلا هذا الجيش الذي سار إلى الشام، وهذا الذي أوصى الله نبيه به) (al-Wāqidī (n.d.): 16)



of the campaign of the Prophet. Furthermore, this could have given the Muslims the more determination to continue their campaign when they remembered that, for almost all the way; this was the same road that the Prophet took during his *Ghazwah* of Tabūk, in which he said the *ḥadīth* of conquering Islamicjerusalem. Especially when they remembered that many mosques on that route have been built in the places where the Prophet prayed on his way to Tabūk (al-Wāqidī 1966: (3) 999).

Taking all these facts together gives us a strong impression of the importance of the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk; this *Ghazwah* was not only a step made by the Prophet, but was also one of his most important steps in preparing for the conquest of Islamicjerusalem.



2.7 Conclusion:

The researcher concludes that the first motivation for the Prophet to go to the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk was not to fight the Byzantines, but to make practical preparations for the Muslims to conquer Islamicjerusalem in the near future (in the event, a few years later). The choice of the site of Tabūk for the camp, the authentic *ḥadīth* that the Prophet said in Tabūk, and the treaty between the Prophet and the people of Aylah in particular, are the main factors that lead to the conclusion that the Prophet had another aim rather than that of fighting the Byzantines.

Finally, Tabūk can apparently be considered a chief landmark in the history of the conquest of Islamicjerusalem. It can be clearly stated that this *Ghazwah* was one of the most important preparations for the conquest of Islamicjerusalem, and practical evidence for the unique and firm relationship between Prophet Muhammad, as a political leader, and Islamicjerusalem.



Chapter Three

The *Ba'th* of Usāmah bin Zaid (11 A.H. - 632 C.E.)

3.1 Introduction:

The *Ba'th* (mission)⁴³ of Usāmah bin Zaid⁴⁴ was the last military activity that the Prophet planned for and arranged in his life. Nevertheless, it did not occur until after the Prophet's death; it was the first act of his successor, Abū Bakr. Although this *Ba'th* was not fulfilled during the life of the Prophet, the researcher argues that the insistence of the Prophet, until the last moments of his life, on sending this *Ba'th* should be taken into consideration.

The researcher argues that this *Ba'th* is one of the most important incidents in the life of the Prophet and his relationship with Islamic Jerusalem. In fact, it can be considered the last preparatory step the Prophet made towards the conquest of Islamic Jerusalem. To study the accuracy of this hypothesis, the researcher will look into some issues related to this *Ba'th* and its relationship with Islamic Jerusalem, such as the reasons for this *Ba'th*, the destination of the *Ba'th* and its significance, and the significance of this *Ba'th* in the conquest of Islamic Jerusalem after the death of Prophet Muhammad.

⁴³ The terminology *Ba'th* means 'sending'; it can be translated into English as 'Mission', but it was noted that most of the historians and the scholars of *sīrah* and *ḥadīth* used the terminology *Sariyyah*, which means literary in Arabic 'brigade', to refer to a military mission in which the Prophet did not take part, except for this one. Therefore, the researcher will use the terminology *Ba'th* to refer to this incident.

⁴⁴ Usāmah bin Zaid bin Hārithah: his title was 'the beloved, the son of the beloved', because he and his father were very much beloved by the Prophet, his mother was Um Ayman, the nanny of Prophet Muhammad, and he was 18 or 20 when Prophet Muhammad died. The Prophet appointed him leader of the army of this *Ba'th* when he was still young, although there were many senior companions in the army. He died in Madīnah in the year 54 A.H. (See al-'Asqalānī 1978: (1) 31).



3.2 The reasons for this *Ba'th*:

While the majority of scholars such as Ibn Ishāq (Guillaume 1955: 678), Ibn Hishām (1987: (4) 253) and al-Ṭabarī (1998 (3) 244) did not mention a specific reason for the *Ba'th* of Usāmah, some historians like al-Ya'qūbī (n.d.: (2) 113), Ibn 'Asākir (d. 571 A.H.) (1995: (8) 64), al-Wāqidī (1966: (3) 1117) and Ibn Sa'd (d. 230 A.H.) (1997: (2) 145) have mentioned some narrations and *ḥadīths* that show that this *Ba'th* aimed to take revenge for the killing of Zaid bin Ḥārithah, the first leader of the army of Mu'tah, who was also the father of Usāmah, the leader of the army in this *Ba'th*.

The researcher argues that to consider the revenge for the killing of Zaid as the main reason for this *Ba'th* might not be convincing; the period between the two incidents is more than three years, and this is a long enough period to reject considering revenge as the main reason for the *Ba'th*.

Furthermore, it was noted that al-Ya'qūbī tried to connect both Tabūk and Mu'tah with the *Ba'th* of Usāmah by claiming that the Prophet went for the *Ghazwah* to Tabūk to take revenge for Ja'far, and sent the *Ba'th* of Usāmah to take revenge for Zaid. The researcher argues that this cannot be acceptable. On one hand, it is not reasonable to claim that the Prophet would send two armies to take revenge on two of his leaders in Mu'tah and miss out the third leader, 'Abdullāh bin Rawāḥah.



On the other hand, the long period between Mu'tah and this *Ba'th*, is enough evidence that taking revenge for Mu'tah cannot be considered as the main reason for the *Ba'th* of Usāmah.

However, a very problematic issue arising here concerns the orders of the Prophet to Usāmah to burn some places in the destination of the *Ba'th* as was mentioned in the *ḥadīths* that were narrated by Abū Dāwūd (d. 275 A.H.) (n.d.: (3) 39), Ibn Mājah (d. 273 A.H.) (2000: 415) and Aḥmad bin Ḥanbal (d. 241 A.H.) (1995: (16) 96); also that the Prophet did not order Usāmah to invite the inhabitants of the destination of the *Ba'th* to Islam before fighting them, as Usāmah had himself stated in a narration of al-Wāqidī (1966: (3) 1123). Does this mean that the spreading of Islam in that region was not the aim of the Prophet when he sent the army of Usāmah? And does it strengthen the “revenge” theory as being the main reason for the *Ba'th*?

To answer this question, the researcher refers to Ahmad al-Shbūl, who argues that the Prophet did not build his military actions and campaigns on the concept of “revenge” (al-Shbūl 1989: (1) 177). The researcher agrees with al-Shbūl to some extent, but adds that it is acceptable to argue that the Prophet waited for the appropriate time to achieve specific aims, like the killing of his delegation of 14 companions in Dhāt Aṭlāḥ, which led to the Battle of Mu'tah.⁴⁵ This can be clarified as holding onto the aim until the good reason occurs; however, this does not mean that the Prophet built his actions on revenge.

⁴⁵ See this dissertation, pages: 20.



Ordering the army of Usāmah to burn some sites within their destination and not ordering them to invite the people of that destination to Islam does not necessarily mean that their target was revenge. A very important fact can be given on this point by studying the significance of the *Ba'th* of Usāmah, which will follow on this chapter.

Here the researcher would also like to refer to Khalil Athaminah's opinion on the main cause of the *Ba'th* of Usāmah; he argued that the *Ba'th* of Usāmah reflected the Prophet's desire to examine to what extent the leaders of the southern side of *al-Shām* were trustworthy and committed to the treaties that the Prophet held with them (Athaminah 2000: 96).

The researcher argues that Athaminah's argument is very much appreciated, since it opens a new horizon in understanding the major aim of the Prophet for this *Ba'th*. Such an argument can explain the relationship between this *Ba'th* and the *Ghazwah* to Tabūk, since it shows that the treaties between the Prophet and the inhabitants of the southern region of *al-Shām* like Aylah, for example, were put to the test, which was very important before the start of the conquest of Islamic Jerusalem. This can be better understood by looking at the fact that Islamic Jerusalem was at that time too far from the Islamic-strength centre in Madīnah. A wide campaign to conquer that region needed all the arrangements to be precise and not miss out on any opportunity for unpleasant surprises.

Thus, the researcher contends that the main reason for the *Ba'th* of Usāmah might not be a revenge for the killing of Zaid bin Ḥārithah in Mu'tah; rather it



could be argued that the loss of Zaid in Mu'tah had a relation in one way or another with the *Ba'th* of Usāmah. This could be studied further when looking at some narrations that stated that the Prophet mentioned Zaid bin Ḥārithah while he was preparing the army of Usāmah.

Al-Wāqidi (1966: (3) 1117) mentioned this narration, in which the Prophet said to Usāmah:

O Usāmah, March by the name of Allāh and his blessings, until you reach the Place where your father was killed.⁴⁶

This was the narration on which the scholars, who claimed that this *Ba'th* was to take revenge on Zaid (Usāmah's father), depended as their main evidence. The researcher argues that this narration does not necessarily clarify the major aim of the *Ba'th*, since it is speaking about the place where the mission was to take place. Therefore, it cannot be considered as an evidence that shows the main reason and aim of the *Ba'th* of Usāmah. However, after studying the reasons for this *Ba'th*, the researcher is led to study the destination, which should have had a very important significance in the whole mission and its reasons.

3.3 The destination:

There has been a lot of disagreement among scholars and historians about the destination of this *Ba'th*; some of them like Ibn Ishāq (Guillaume 1955: 678), al-Ṭabarī (1998: (3) 244) and Ibn Hishām (1987: (4) 253), claimed that the *Ba'th*

⁴⁶ يا أسامة، سر على اسم الله وبركته حتى تنتهي إلى مقتل أبيك



was towards “the Balqā’ and al-Dārūm in the land of Palestine”. However, al-Ṭabarī (1998: (3) 269) added in another statement that this *Ba‘th* was towards Ābul al-Zayt, while Ibn ‘Asākir (1995: (8) 64) stated a narration claiming that the destination was Mu’tah.

Nevertheless, many other scholars and historians disagreed among themselves as to whether it was a town called Ubnā (and this was mentioned by Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī (n.d.: (1) 101) and others) or town called Yubnā (mentioned by al-Ya‘qūbī (2002: 167) and others). The first one, according to Yāqūt (n.d.: (1) 101), was situated in al-Balqā’, which is the same region where Mu’tah is situated. The latter was situated, as Yāqūt (n.d.: (5) 491) stated, near the city of al-Ramlah in Palestine.

The confusion about these opinions and debates is that the towns are sometimes referred to in different places that are quite far away from each other; there is a long distance between the al-Balqā’ region and the region around al-Ramlah, and each of these places has its own significance if it was the destination of this *Ba‘th*.

To solve this problem, the researcher refers to the books of *ḥadīth*, where there was a *ḥadīth* stated by Abū Dāwūd (d. 275 A.H.) (n.d.: (3) 39), Ibn Mājah (d. 273 A.H.) (2000: 415) and Aḥmad bin Ḥanbal (d. 241 A.H.) (1995: (16) 96). The



ḥadīth states that the Prophet ordered Usāmah bin Zaid to attack Ubnā in the morning, then to burn some sites in it.⁴⁷

However, in the narration of Abū Dāwūd, he stated another opinion of one of the narrators, Abū Mus-hir (d. 218 A.H.). Abū Dāwūd said:

Narrated by ‘Abdullāh bin ‘Amr al-Ghazzī, he heard Abū Mus-hir (when he had heard someone says: “Ubnā”) replied: We know better; it’s Yubnā of Palestine.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ The Arabic text: أن يغير على أبنى صباحاً ثم يحرق. However, there are some slight differences among the narrations of the three scholars: Abū Dāwūd’s narrations stated that Usāmah said that the Prophet ordered him to attack Ubnā at morning and burn sites in it. Ibn Mājah stated almost the same narration. Ibn Ḥanbal stated two narrations: the first one is the same as Ibn Mājah and Abū Dāwūd’s. The second stated that Abū Bakr asked Usāmah (after the death of the Prophet) where the destination was that the Prophet had ordered him to attack; he said: “he (The Prophet) ordered me to attack Ubnā at morning and burn” (Ibn Ḥanbal 1995: (16) 107).

However, there was a problematic issue related to the narrations of Ibn Ḥanbal; in the printed edition of the *Musnad* of Ibn Ḥanbal that the researcher took this narration from, the destination was stated as “Lubnā”. The researcher tried to find manuscripts of the *Musnad* that could show the truth about this case but, unfortunately, he could not find any manuscript of the *Musnad* that contains this *ḥadīth* in particular. Therefore, the researcher compared this copy with another older printed copy of the *Musnad* that was printed in 1895 where it clearly mentioned “Ubnā” (1895: (5) 205), and the researcher checked other copies of the explanations of the *Musnad* of Ibn Ḥanbal like *al-Fath al-Rabbānī* by al-Bannā (n.d.: (13) 66), as well as the index of the *ḥadīths* of the *Musnad* that is called *Aṭrāf Musnad al-Imām Aḥmad bin Ḥanbal* by al-‘Asqālānī (1993: (1) 243). The researcher found in these copies that the destination that was mentioned was Ubnā, not Lubnā. Thus, the researcher argues that the original text of the narrations of Ibn Ḥanbal most likely contained the terminology “Ubnā”, not “Lubnā”, and this shows that Hamza Zain, the editor of this edition of *al-Musnad*, might have made a spelling mistake while taking the text from the original manuscript, or at least a printing mistake.

⁴⁸ The Arabic text: حدثنا عبدالله بن عمرو الغزي سمعت أبا مسهر قيل له أبنى، قال: نحن أعلم، هي بينى فلسطين (Abū Dāwūd (n.d.): (3) 39).

In fact, the researcher found that Al-Bakrī (d. 487 A.H.) (1998: (1) 91-92) quoted this *ḥadīth* from Abū Dāwūd in a different way; the narration there states:

Abū Dāwūd said: I heard Ibn Abī ‘Umar al-‘Adanī said: I heard Abū Mus-hir – when he heard someone says: Ubnā – replied: We know more; it’s between Palestine and al-Balqā’; it is the place where the Messenger of Allāh sent Zaid (the Father of Usāmah) along to, with Ja‘far bin Abī Ṭālib and ‘Abdullāh bin Rawāḥah, but all of them were killed in Mu’tah of al-Balqā’.

وقال أبو داود: وسمعت ابن أبي عمر العدني قال: سمعت أبا مسهر قيل له أبنى، قال: نحن أعلم، هي بين فلسطين والبلقاء، هي التي بعث إليها رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم زيداً أبا أسامة مع جعفر بن أبي طالب وعبدالله بن رواحة، فقتلوا جميعاً رضي الله عنهم بمؤتة من أرض البلقاء.

The researcher argues that this narration contradicts the above-mentioned one, since in the first one, Abū Mus-hir claimed that Ubnā (which was mentioned in the *ḥadīth*) is in fact Yubnā of Palestine, but here he claimed that it is near Mu’tah.


In order to check the accuracy of this narration of al-Bakrī, the researcher refers to two facts: first, the second narration was narrated from Ibn Abū ‘Umar al-‘Adanī, while the first one was →




At the same time, al-Sahāranfūrī (d. 1346 A.H.), in his explanation of *Sunan Abū Dāwūd*, claimed that the place was Yubnā in Palestine (n.d.: (12) 124-125), whereas al-Kāndahalwī, who edited al-Sahāranfūrī’s book argued that the place was Ubnā, not Yubnā (ibid).

Meanwhile, in order to gain more understanding of this issue, the researcher has gathered the different opinions of historians and scholars of *ḥadīth* and *sīrah* in the following table:

taken from ‘Abdullah bin ‘Amr al-Ghazzī. The two names “al-Ghazzī” الغزي and “al-‘Adanī” العدني are close to each other in the Arabic language. The researcher could not find the name (Ibn Abū ‘Umar al-‘Adanī) in the books of the narrators of the *ḥadīth*, unlike al-Ghazzī (al-Sahāranfūrī: (12) 124), which gives the impression that the copy of al-Bakrī was not accurate. Second, the researcher searched many printed copies of the *Sunan* of Abū Dāwūd, but he could not find any similar narration to al-Bakrī’s. In order to further check this case, the researcher compared the printed issues of the *Sunan* of Abū Dāwūd with two manuscripts of the same book in order to check whether there had been any differences between them in the text for example. The first one was written in the 12th century C.E., and the narration in it was the same as the first one “We know more; it’s Yubnā of Palestine” as can be seen here:



The second manuscript, which was written in the 13th century C.E., mentioned the same text as well:



However, the researcher would like to refer to the fact that Abū Dāwūd already has another book called *al-Marāsīl*, and he could have mentioned the narration that al-Bakrī quoted in that book. However, this is still a problematic issue, since the researcher could not find this book (*al-Marāsīl*) or any manuscript of it, so the real source of the narration of al-Bakrī could not be found. However, the researcher argues that; as long as the other book of Abū Dāwūd could not be checked, this leaves us with the fact that the main book of *ḥadīth* by Abū Dāwūd, which is the *Sunan*, did not mention the narration that al-Bakrī quoted, in addition to the study of the two names of the narrators (al-Gazzī and al-‘Adanī) as the researcher mentioned before. Therefore, the researcher argues that the narration that we have in the *Sunan* of Abū Dāwūd is the one that one shall rely on, not al-Bakrī’s narration.



No.	Scholar	Opinion	Notes
1	Al-Ya'qūbī (2002: 167)	Yubnā	He narrated the <i>ḥadīth</i> of Usāmah as (Yubnā), not (Ubnā)
2	Ibn Sa'd (1997: (2) 145)	Ubnā	
3	Al-Ṭabarī (1998: (3) 244-269)	- Al-Balqā' and al-Dārūm - Ābul al-Zayt	He stated two opinions
4	Ibn Ishāq (1955: 678)	Al-Balqā' and al-Dārūm	
5	Ibn Hishām (1987: (4) 253)	Al-Balqā' and al-Dārūm	
6	Al-Suhaylī (n.d.: (4) 385)	Ubnā	
7	Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī (n.d.: (1) 101)	- Ubnā - Ābul al-Zayt	He stated two opinions
8	Al-Bakrī (d. 487 A.H.) (1998: (1) 91)	Ubnā	
9	Abū Dāwūd (n.d.: (3) 39)	Ubnā	
10	Abū Mus-hir	Yubnā	A narration in Abū Dāwūd's book (n.d.: (3) 39)
11	Al-Sahāranfūrī (n.d.: (11) 124-125)	Yubnā	
12	Al-Kāndahalwī	Ubnā	He stated his opinion in his editing of al-Sahāranfūrī's book (n.d.: (11) 124-125)
13	Ibn Ḥanbal (1995: (16) 96)	Ubnā	
14	Ibn Mājah (2000: 415)	Ubnā	
15	Al-Bannā (n.d.: (13) 66-67)	Ubnā	He also mentioned that Ibn Qudāmah al-Maqdisī said that it is near al-Karak at the borders of <i>al-Shām</i>
16	Al-Wāqidī (1966: (3) 1117)	- Ubnā - Mu'tah	He named his chapter on this <i>Ba'th</i> 'the <i>Ghazwah</i> of Usāmah bin Zaid to Mu'tah', but stated that it was towards Ubnā
17	Ibn 'Asākir (1995: (8) 46-64)	- Ubnā - The People of Mu'tah	He stated two opinions
18	Ibn Kathīr (n.d.: (4) 440)	Al-Balqā' and al-Dārūm	

Table 1: Opinions of some scholars concerning the destination of the *Ba'th* of Usāmah



The results of this study can be summarised as following:

The Proposed Place	Number of Opinions
Ubnā	11
Al-Balqā' and al-Dārūm	4
Yubnā	3
Mu'tah	2
Ābul al-Zayt	2

Table 2: Summarising the opinions of scholars on the destination of the *Ba'th* of Usāmah

It can be clearly seen that most scholars and historians agreed that the destination of this *Ba'th* was towards Ubnā in al-Balqā'. However, al-Shbūl (1989: (1) 177) tried to elaborate on this issue, claiming that Usāmah might have attacked more than one destination in *al-Shām*, between the two destinations. Al-Shbūl based his opinion on considering al-Dārūm as being situated near Gaza as al-Ḥamawī mentioned (n.d.: (2) 483).

On the contrary, the researcher disagrees with al-Shbūl, and argues that al-Dārūm that was mentioned by Ibn Ishāq and some others (al-Balqā' and al-Dārūm) might not be the one near Gaza in Palestine. Al-Ḥamawī stated another name before mentioning al-Dārūm, that is "Dārūmā" (ibid); this place, according to al-Ḥamawī, is near the Dead Sea, where the cities of the People of Lot were situated. This gives us a very important insight, i.e. most of the historians, especially the ones who mentioned al-Dārūm, never mentioned it alone, but always accompanied it with al-Balqā', which gives the impression that they are close to each other, and that applies to Dārūmā and al-Balqā', not al-Dārūm and al-Balqā'. Not only that, but al-Balqā' itself contains Dārūmā, since al-Balqā' is a region, while Dārūmā is a small area inside al-Balqā'. Also, by studying the



events and the way that Usāmah took in this *Ba'th*, the researcher concludes that Usāmah's act was very fast that and he did not spend much time in this *Ba'th*, and no historian mentioned that Usāmah attacked more than one place. Therefore, connecting all these circumstances with the narration of al-Wāqidī (1966: (3) 1117), in which the Prophet ordered Usāmah to march towards the place where his (Usāmah) father was killed, strengthens the opinion that Ibn Ishāq and other historians, who mentioned al-Balqā' and al-Dārūm, were speaking about Dārūmā that is a part of al-Balqā', not al-Dārūm that is near Gaza.

In addition, when one tries to find Ābul al-Zayt, one learns that Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī states that it was in Jordan on the borders of *al-Shām* (Yāqūt (n.d.): (1) 68). This shows that most of the scholars were speaking about a town or a place in al-Balqā', which means it was near Mu'tah, i.e. on the borders of Islamic Jerusalem, except those who claimed that the Place was Yubnā, situated near al-Ramlah in Palestine.

The researcher argues that it seems reasonable to argue that the opinions of the scholars, who claimed that the destination of this *Ba'th* was Yubnā, were established on the basis of a false transcription of the *ḥadīth* of the Prophet about the destination of the *Ba'th* of Usāmah, as all three narrations of this *ḥadīth* in the reliable books of *ḥadīth* stated clearly that the destination was Ubnā. This shows that there may have been some mistakes made when historians transcribed some of these narrations such as the statement of al-Ya'qūbī of the *ḥadīth* as being towards Yubnā (Ya'qūbī 2002: 167), and especially that the two words (Ubnā)



and (Yubnā) in the Arabic language can be written in a very close way; the word (Ubnā) can be written in Arabic أبنا or أبني, while the word (Yubnā) can be written بينا or بينى.

The researcher argues that this confusion, among those scholars who claimed that the destination of the *Ba'th* was Yubnā, might be due to the reputation of Yubnā in Palestine. The researcher argues that many scholars mentioned Yubnā when speaking about Palestine, which could give us an impression of the great importance of this town. This can be seen, for example, in Ibn al-Faqīh's (d. 290 A.H.) book '*Mukhtaṣar Kitāb al-Buldān*', where he mentioned that Yubnā was a district in his time, which means that Yubnā had obvious importance.

However, as the importance of the location of Ubnā comes to be more understood, another question arises: does Ubnā still exist today? The researcher did not find any recent source that had tried to locate this town, and the researcher argues that such a very important place like Ubnā should be defined, especially since the incident that occurred in it had a very important repercussion on the history of this region, especially Islamic Jerusalem. The researcher found some hints about the exact place of Ubnā in the narrations of al-Wāqidī (1966: (3) 1117) and Ibn Sa'd (1997: (2) 145); the Prophet mentioned, when he ordered Usāmah to march towards Ubnā, that it was the place where his father (Zaid bin Hārithah) was killed in the Battle of Mu'tah.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ The Arabic text: سر إلى موضع مقتل أبيك, and Ibn 'Asākir (1995: (8) 64) mentioned another supportive narration.



The researcher finds here a very important glimpse about the place of Ubnā. The above-mentioned narrations are the only ones that give hints about the site of Ubnā, i.e. Ubnā is the place where the three leaders of the army of Mu'tah were killed and buried. The present place where the three leaders were buried is well-known in the Kingdom of Jordan; it is a town called "al-Mazār", and it can be seen in the following map:




Figure 5: The location of al-Mazār⁵⁰

It is noticed that this town's name is new, since it was not mentioned in the primary sources of the geography of this region. The researcher argues that it seems that the name of this town was Ubnā, and was then changed to "al-Mazār", referring to the graves of the three leaders of the Muslim army in Mu'tah. Hence, the terminology "al-Mazār" means "the place to be visited", and this town has no significance or importance today except for the graves of the three leaders.⁵¹

Therefore, depending on an examination of the location of this town, and the

⁵⁰ Global Gazetteer: http://www.fallingrain.com/world/JO/9/Al_Mazar.html, seen on 30th June 2005.

⁵¹ The researcher, nevertheless, has visited the town of al-Mazār and Mu'tah as well, and he found that the location and the geography of this town makes it most likely as it fits really closely to the descriptions of Ubnā as understood when studying all related to it in the historical sources.



statement of the Prophet that Ubnā was the place where Zaid the father of Usāmah was killed, the researcher concludes that al-Mazār today is most likely Ubnā itself, especially because the location of al-Mazār is to the south of Mu'tah, which means it was where the Muslim army of Mu'tah were situated, since they came from the south.

However, going back to the issue of the main reason for this *Ba'th*; the researcher argues that stating that the Prophet ordered Usāmah to march towards the same place where his father was killed, does not mean that the reason for the *Ba'th* was to revenge the killing of Zaid. Sending Usāmah to the same place where his father was killed does not mean that this was the major aim of the *Ba'th*. It seems most likely that the Prophet said this since Usāmah knew the place where his father was killed as he had participated in the Battle of Mu'tah (See Ibn 'Asākir 1995: (8) 46). Therefore, it was reasonable to mention that the destination of the army was the same place where Zaid had been killed.

3.4 The significance of the *Ba'th* of Usāmah:

The *Ba'th* of Usāmah did not take place in the lifetime of the Prophet, although the Prophet strictly insisted on sending the army by stating many times, during his last illness: “Send the *Ba'th* of Usāmah” (Ibn Hishām 1987: (4) 299). After the Prophet died and his first successor Abū Bakr was elected, the first thing that Abū Bakr began his rule with was to send the *Ba'th* of Usāmah towards Ubnā as the Prophet had ordered.



Some Muslim sources indicated that many of the companions of the Prophet tried their best to convince Abū Bakr to postpone this mission until he had secured Madīnah and the region around it, especially when the *Riddah* (apostasy) movement started right after the death of the Prophet; however, he strongly rejected this, and insisted on sending the army immediately saying:

Even if I knew that the lions would eat me in this city, I would send the army of Usāmah bin Zaid, as the Prophet said: “Send the Army of Usāmah”.⁵²

The researcher argues that, on one hand, the insistence of the Prophet to send this army as fast as possible gives a very important glance at his understanding of the importance of this *Ba‘th*. On the other hand, the strict insistence of Abū Bakr on sending this army at that critical time shows that Abū Bakr knew something that the other companions did not know.

This was found after the end of *Hurūb al-Riddah*, when Abū Bakr delivered a speech to the Muslims:

You should know that the Messenger of Allāh was intending to conquer *al-Shām*, but he died. I intend to send the heroes of the Muslims to *al-Shām* with their families and money, though, the messenger of Allāh told me about this before his death.⁵³

This statement of Abū Bakr can be considered the clearest evidence that the Prophet had planned to conquer Islamic Jerusalem, and he had informed only Abū Bakr about this. This clarifies also the insistence of Abū Bakr to send the *Ba‘th*

⁵² لو علمت أن السباع تأكلني في هذه المدينة لأنفذت جيش أسامة بن زيد كما قال النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم: أنفذوا بعث أسامة (al-Wāqidi 1990: 51)

⁵³ واعلموا أن رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم كان عوّل أن يصرف همته إلى الشام فقبضه الله إليه، ألا وإني عازم على أن أوجه أبطال المسلمين إلى الشام بأهلهم ومالهم فإن رسول الله أنبأني بذلك قبل موته (al-Wāqidi (n.d.): 5)



of Usāmah. Also, the statement of Abū Bakr that he would send the Muslims there “with their families and money” is an expression of an intention to conquer that land.

Another important fact is that the *Ba‘th* of Usāmah was an essential element in rescuing the reputation of Muslims after the death of the Prophet. This can be seen clearly in the statement of Ibn ‘Asākir about the impact of this *Ba‘th*:

The news of the death of the Prophet came to Heraclius together with the news of the attack of Usāmah on a side of his (Heraclius’) land, so the Byzantines said: those (the Muslims) were not affected by their Prophet’s death; on the contrary, they attacked our lands!⁵⁴

This statement shows that the news of the Muslims used to be sent to Heraclius, which shows the importance of the Muslims and their movements to and their influence on the Byzantine Empire. It also indicates the importance of sending the *Ba‘th* of Usāmah at that time particularly; which explains the insistence of the Prophet and his successor on sending this army. The researcher argues that the Prophet knew that he would die in that illness; this can be proved by looking at the *ḥadīth*, in which the Prophet told his daughter Fāṭimah during his last illness that he would die during that illness (al-‘Asqalānī 1997: (7) 133). Thus, this revealed that the Prophet knew that he would die soon, and he insisted on sending the army, which shows his intention of driving the Muslims’ intention towards that region.

⁵⁴ فقدم بنعي رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم على هرقل وإغارة أسامة في ناحية من أرضه خيراً واحداً، فقالت الروم: ما بالي
هؤلاء يموت أصحابهم أن أغاروا على أرضنا (Ibn ‘Asākir 1995: (8) 63)



However, one might argue that Abū Bakr did not understand that the Prophet intended to conquer Islamicjerusalem but *al-Shām*, since he informed the Muslims that he intended to send armies to *al-Shām*. The researcher argues that Islamicjerusalem as being the purpose of Abū Bakr can be understood by looking at the routes that he ordered the four armies to march through, especially the army of ‘Amr bin al-‘Āṣ as was elaborated in the second chapter.⁵⁵

In addition, the researcher points again to the argument of Athaminah (2000: 96) that the Prophet might have wanted, from this *Ba‘th*, to be ascertained about the loyalty of the tribes in that region, before the start of the conquest campaign. The researcher argues that this was one of the most important significances of the *Ba‘th* of Usāmah, and it shows that this *Ba‘th* was, indeed, a practical start of the campaign to conquer Islamicjerusalem.

⁵⁵ See this dissertation, pages 47-49.



3.5 Conclusion:

The researcher concludes that the *Ba'th* of Usāmah was a major element in the Muslim campaign to conquer Islamic Jerusalem. It has been noted that the Prophet did not prepare this army and order it to march towards that region in order to take revenge, but as part of a plan to conquer this land, and this was proved by the statement of Abū Bakr after the death of the Prophet.

The researcher also concluded that the destination of this *Ba'th* was not inside the Palestine of today, but near Mu'tah, which shows the importance of that area as being a gate to Islamic Jerusalem. On the other hand, the insistence of Abū Bakr on sending the *Ba'th* had a great role in restoring the reputation of the Muslims after the death of the Prophet, which must have helped greatly in the forthcoming conquest of Islamic Jerusalem, especially concerning the morale of the Byzantine army and their understanding of the Muslim strength.

To sum up, the researcher has found that the *Ba'th* of Usāmah bin Zaid was, indeed, a practical start to the conquest of Islamic Jerusalem. Its significances in the conquest are clear, and show the great efforts made by Prophet Muhammad in preparing his nation, and drawing up plans and taking the road to conquer Islamic Jerusalem, the third holiest place in Islam.



Conclusion

This study has focused on three major incidents that took place in the lifetime of the Prophet: the Battle of Mu'tah, the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk, and the *Ba'th* of Usāmah bin Zaid.

When the first incident, the Battle of Mu'tah, was studied, the researcher concluded that the Prophet most likely sent the first army to examine the nature of the land and the strength of the enemy, to obtain the necessary experience in a forthcoming campaign. Moreover, the statement of the Prophet – after the Muslim army came back from Mu'tah – that the army would turn back and resume fighting – shows clearly that Mu'tah was not an isolated incident, but part of a chain of incidents and the steps towards something further, namely, conquering Islamicjerusalem. This was proved by connecting the statement of the Prophet, that of turning back and resuming fighting, with the upcoming events that were related to the same goal.

The location of Mu'tah also had its own importance; since it was, according to some scholars, on the borders of Islamicjerusalem. It was a gate to Islamicjerusalem. This can be understood by having a full connection with both: the statement of the Prophet after Mu'tah (about resuming fighting), and the forthcoming incidents that took place afterwards, especially the *Ghazwah* to Tabūk.



Regarding the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk, the researcher concluded that this *Ghazwah* was clearly aimed at something other than fighting the Byzantines, namely, the making of preparations on the ground for the forthcoming campaign, which – on the other hand – needed such arrangements due to the great strength of the enemy, as well as the great distance between the Muslim capital, i.e. Madīnah, and Islamic Jerusalem. This may be clearly seen from much that took place during this *Ghazwah*, like the statement of the Prophet about **Conquering** Islamic Jerusalem **for the first time in his life**, and the agreements that were held between the Prophet and the tribes around Tabūk, especially Aylah, which were essential for the campaign to conquer Islamic Jerusalem as was seen when the application of these agreements in the campaign to conquer Islamic Jerusalem was studied.

The researcher found throughout this study that the Prophet was not aiming to fight the Byzantines in order to ‘compensate’ the people of Makkah for what they thought would be a ‘loss’ in their trade after they became Muslims, as some scholars argued, such as Ibn Kathīr. Rather, there was a greater aim deserved that the Prophet would march a very long distance to achieve, that is, to make the preparations for the conquest of Islamic Jerusalem. In fact, Tabūk can be considered as a field visit of the political leader of the Muslim state, in order to supervise the preparations and set out the plan.

However, a thorough study for the events that occurred during this *Ghazwah* shows that the Prophet was not intending to fight anybody, but he was to set out some preparations and make a wise strategic plan for the Muslims to come to



and conquer this region in the future. This plan was revealed and declared by Abū Bakr after the death of the Prophet.

In the third chapter, the researcher studied the *Ba'th* of Usāmah bin Zaid towards Ubnā and examined whether it could be understood as the last preparatory step made by the Prophet towards the conquest of Islamic Jerusalem. The researcher was able in this chapter to show the importance of this incident in the campaign to conquer Islamic Jerusalem. A very important outcome that the researcher found was being able to find the actual location of the destination of this *Ba'th*, i.e. Ubnā, which was mentioned in the *ḥadīths* of the Prophet. The researcher concluded that Ubnā is the small town of al-Mazār today, and is situated near Mu'tah, unlike the claims of some scholars and narrators such as Abū Mus-hir for example. The researcher also concluded that this *Ba'th* was aiming to examine the loyalty of the tribes and the towns that had agreements with the Prophet since the *Ghazwah* of Tabūk, and this aim was successfully achieved. This was proved by the success of Usāmah in attacking the Byzantines and coming back to Madīnah without any losses, which proves that the *Ba'th* of Usāmah was an essential step in conquering Islamic Jerusalem, and explains the reason why the Prophet insisted on sending the army of Usāmah and ordered the Muslims to send this *Ba'th* despite his severe illness.

However, regarding the reasons for these three incidents (Mu'tah, Tabūk and *Ba'th* of Usāmah): claiming the taking of revenge for the killing of companions, Muslim leaders or armies, was a part of the whole reasons for any of the three



incidents, especially the Battle of Mu'tah and the *Ba'th* of Usāmah, does not necessarily mean that the Prophet was only aiming at taking revenge.

Revenge was not the main and only aspect and basis for deciding the military actions of the Prophet. It could be understood as taking the right opportunity to achieve goals, and this can be seen by connecting all the links and events throughout the three major incidents.

Generally, it can be concluded, that Mu'tah was the first examination of the enemy and the region of the conflict, Tabūk was the main preparation point and the station in which the most important arrangements took place, and the *Ba'th* of Usāmah was the last testing out of the plan and the preparations before the start of the military campaign to conquer Islamicjerusalem.

Throughout this dissertation, the researcher elaborates the hypothesis of El-Awaisi, and proves that there was a real plan on Prophet Muhammad's part to conquer Islamicjerusalem, though not by himself, as was shown when the *hadīth* of the Prophet about the conquest of Islamicjerusalem was studied. This gives us a very important glimpse into the discovering that the Prophet had his own vision, as a political leader, towards conquering that region, and that his relationship with Islamicjerusalem was not limited to the spiritual aspect.

The three steps have to be understood together as one context; it is inaccurate to separate them while studying the relationship between the Prophet (as a political leader) and Islamicjerusalem.



Finally, the researcher would recommend a thorough and comprehensive study of all the incidents that took place in the lifetime of the Prophet, which have a direct or indirect relationship with Islamicjerusalem and can be understood as steps towards the conquest of Islamicjerusalem, due to their significance in the conquest of Islamicjerusalem. This study focused on only three major practical steps of the Prophet. Other practical movements made by the Prophet, as a political leader, towards the conquest of Islamicjerusalem should also be studied. For example, all the military missions that the Prophet sent towards that region in his life. In addition, a full study of the Prophet's treaties with the tribes that were located on the road to Islamicjerusalem should be made.

The researcher would also recommend a comprehensive study of the other non-military steps and incidents that show links between the Prophet and Islamicjerusalem, like praying towards Islamicjerusalem before turning towards the *Ka'bah* and the Night Journey of the Prophet from Makkah to Islamicjerusalem. Such a study would open up new horizons towards understanding the history of Islamicjerusalem in the Prophetic era and its relationship with Muslims, which would add new keys of knowledge to an understanding of, the history not only this unique region, but also of all humanity.



Bibliography

PRIMARY SOURCES:

Ibn ‘Asākir, Abū al-Qāsim ‘Alī bin al-Ḥasan bin Hibatullāh bin ‘Abdullāh.

1995. *Tārīkh Madīnat Dimashq*. ed. Muḥib al-Dīn Abī Sa‘īd ‘Umar bin Gharāmah al-‘Amrawī. Beirut: Dar al-Fikr

Al-‘Asqalānī, Aḥmad bin Ḥajar. 1993. *Aṭrāf Musnad al-Imām Aḥmad bin Ḥanbal*. ed. Zuhair bin Nasir al-Nasir. Damascus: Dar Ibn Kathir, 1st edition

Al-‘Asqalānī, Ahmad bin ‘Ali bin Hajar. 1997. *Fatḥ al-Bārī Sharḥ Saḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*. ed. Muhammad Fu’ād ‘Abdul Bāqī. Riyadh: Dar Al Salam, 1st edition

Al-‘Asqalānī, Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad bin ‘Alī bin Ḥajar. 1978. *al-Iṣābah fī Tamyīz al-Ṣaḥābah*. Beirut: Dar al-Fikr

Al-Bakrī, Abū ‘Ubayd ‘Abdullāh bin ‘Abd al-‘Azīz. 1998. *Mu‘jam Mas Tu‘jim Min Asmā’ al-Buldān wa al-Mawāḍi‘*. Beirut: Dar Al-Kotob al-Ilmiyah, 1st edition

Al-Balādhurī, Aḥmad bin Yahya bin Jābir. 1992. *al-Buldān wa Futūḥuhā wa Aḥkāmuḥā*. ed. Suhail Zakkār. Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1st edition



Al-Bukhārī, Muhammad bin Ismā‘īl. 1987. *al-Jāmi‘ al-Ṣaḥīḥ al-Mukhtaṣar*. ed.

Al-Bughā, Muṣṭafā Dīb. Beirut: Dar Ibn Kathīr, 3rd edition

Abū Dawūd, Sulaymān bin al-Ash‘ath al-Sajistānī. (n.d.). *Sunan Abū Dawūd*.

Beirut: Dar al-Jeel

Guillaume, A. 1955. *The life of Muhammad, a translation of Ishāq’s Sīrat Rasūl*

Allāh. London: Oxford University Press

Al-Ḥamawī, Yaqūt bin ‘Abdullah. (n.d.). *Mu‘jam al-Buldān*. Beirut: Dar Al-

Kutub Al-Ilmiyyah

Ibn Ḥanbal, Aḥmad. 1995. *al-Musnad*. ed. Hamza Ahmad al-Zain. Cairo: Dar al-

Hadith, 1st edition

Ibn Ḥanbal, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad. 1895. *Musnad al-Imām Aḥmad ibn*

Ḥanbal: wa-bi-hāmishihi Muntakhab kanz al-‘ummāl fī sunan al-aqwāl wa-al-af‘āl. ed. Muḥammad al-Zahrī al-Ghamrāwī. Cairo: Aḥmad al-

Bābī al-Ḥalabī

Ibn Ḥibbān, Muhammad. 2000. *al-Sīrah al-Nabawiyyah*. ed. ‘Allūsh, ‘Abd al-

Salām bin Muhammad. Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1st edition



Ibn Hishām. 1987. *al-Sīrah al-Nabawiyyah*. ed. Tadmurī, ‘Umar. Cairo: Dar al-Rayyan lil-Turath, 1st edition

Ibn Hishām. 1998. *Summarizing the Sirah of Ibn Hisham*. ed. Sulaima al-Sheikh Mihammed. Beirut: Dar El Fikr

Ibn Kathīr, Imam. 2001. *The Seerah of Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W)*. ed. Muhammad Ali Halabi Al-Athari. London: Al-Firdous Ltd.

Ibn Kathīr, Abū al-Fidā’ Ismā‘īl. (n.d.). *Al-Sīrah al-Nabawiyyah*. ed. ‘Abd al-Wāhid, Muṣṭafā. Beirut: Dar Iḥyā’ al-Turath al-‘Arabī

Ibn Kathīr, ‘Imād al-Dīn Abū al-Fidā’ Ismā‘īl. 1994. *Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘Aẓīm*. ed. Al-Arna’ūt, ‘Abd al-Qādir. Damascus: Maktabat Dar al-Faiha’, 1st edition

Ibn Mājah. 2000. *Sunan Ibn Mājah*. Liechtenstein: Thesaurus Islamicus Foundation

Al-Naisābūrī, Abū al-Ḥasan ‘Alī bin Ahmad al-Wāhidī. (n.d.). *Asbāb al-Nuzūl*. Cairo: Maktabat al-Mutanabbī

Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, Shams al-Dīn Abū ‘Abdillāh Muhammad. 1989. *Zād al-Ma‘ād fī hadyi khair al-‘Ibād*. Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Qayyimah, 1st edition



Al-Qizwīnī, Zakariyyāh bin Muhammad bin Maḥmūd. n.d. *Āthār al-Bilād wa Akhbār al-'Ibād*. Beirut: Dar Sadir

Al-Qurṭubī, Abu Abdullah Muhammad bin Ahmad. 1998. *al-Jāmi' li'ahkām al-Qur'ān*. ed. Jamīl, Sidqī Muhammad. Beirut: Dar el-Fikr

Ibn Sa'd, Muhammad bin Sa'd bin Manī' al-Hāshimī. 1997. *al-Ṭabaqāt al-Kubrāh*. ed. Muhammad 'Abd al-Qādir 'Aṭā. Beirut: Dar al-Kotob al-Ilmiyah

Al-Ṣuyūfī, Jalāl al-Dīn. (n.d.). *Lubāb al-Nuqūl fī Asbāb al-Nuzūl*. ed. Al-Nashartī, Ḥamzah and others. Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Qayyimah

Al-Ṭabarī, Abu Ja'far Muhammad bin Jarīr. 1999. *Jāmi' al-Bayān fī ta'wīl al-Qur'ān*. Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'ilmiyyah, 3rd edition

Al-Ṭabarī, Abu Ja'far Muhammad bin Jarīr. 1998. *Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī*. ed. Ṣidqī Jamīl al-'Aṭṭār. Beirut: Darelfikr, 1st edition

Al-Wāqidī, Abū 'Abdullāh bin 'Umar. (n.d.). *Futūḥ al-Shām*. Beirut: Dar al-Jīl

Al-Wāqidī, Muhammad bin 'Umar bin Wāqid. 1966. *Kitāb al-Maghāzī*. ed. Marsden Jones. London: Oxford University Press



Al-Wāqidī, Muhammad bin ‘Umar bin Wāqid. 1990. *Kitāb al-Riddah*. ed.

Yahya Wahīb al-Juburi. Beirut: Dar al-Gharb al-Islami

Al-Ya‘qūbī, Aḥmad bin Abī Ya‘qūb bin Ja‘far. 2002. *al-Buldān*. ed. Muhammad

Amīn Ḍannāwī. Beirut: Dar al-Kotob al-Ilmiyah

Al-Ya‘qūbī, Aḥmad bin Abī Ya‘qūb bin Ja‘far. (n.d.). *Tārīkh al-Ya‘qūbī*.

Beirut: Dar Sader

SECONDARY SOURCES:

Asad, Muhammad. 2003. *The message of the Qur’ān*. Bristol: the Book

Foundation

Athaminah, Khalil. 2000. *Filistīn fī Khamsat Qurūn: Min al-Fath al-Islāmī ḥattā*

al-Ghazw al-Firanjī (634 – 1099). Beirut: Institute for Palestine
Studies, 1st edition

El-Awaisi, Abd al-Fattah. 1997. *Jerusalem in Islamic History and Spirituality,*

the Significance of Jerusalem in Islam, an Islamic reference.

Dunblane: Islamic Research Academy (IRAP)

Baalbaki, Rohi. 2001. *al-Mawrid a modern Arabic-English Dictionary*. Beirut:

Dar El-Elm Lilmalayin, 15th edition



Al-Bannā, Ahmad Abd al-Rahman. (n.d.). *al-Fath al-Rabbānī litartīb Musnad al-Imām Ahmad bin Hanbal al-Shaybānī*. Beirut: Dar Ihya' al-Turath al-Arabi

Baydūn, Ibrāhīm. 1997. *Tārīkh Bilād al-Shām Iskāliyyat al-Mawqi' wa al-Dawr fī al-'Uṣūr al-Islāmiyyah*. Beirut: Dar al-Muntakhab al-Arabi

Ibn al-Faqīh, Abū Bakr Ahmad bin Muhammad al-Hamadhānī. 1885. *Mukhtaṣar Kitāb al-Buldān*. Beirut: Dar Sadir

Darwazah, Muhammad 'Azzah. 2000. *al-Tafsīr al-Ḥadīth tartīb al-Suwar ḥasab al-Nuzūl*. Beirut: Dar l-Gharb al-Islami, 2nd edition

Abū Māyleh, Breik bin Muhammad Briek. 2004. *Ghazwat Mu'tah wa al-Bu'ūth al-Nabawiyyah al-Shamāliyyah*. Madīnah: Islamic University in Madīnah, 1st edition

Al-Mubarakpuri, Safi-ur-Rahman. 1996. *al-Raheeq al-Makhtūm (the sealed nectar) Biography of the Noble Prophet*. Riyadh: Dar-us-Salam publications, 1st edition

Qal'ajī, Muhammad Rawwās, and Qunaibī, Hāmid Sādiq. 1988. *Mu'jam Lughat al-Fuqahā' (Dictionary of Islamic legal terminology) Arabic-English*. Beirut: Dar An-Nafaes, 2nd Edition



Abū al-Rub, Hānī. 2002. *Tārīkh Filisṭīn fī Ṣadr al-Islām*. Jerusalem: Manshurat Bayt al-Maqdis, 1st edition

Al-Sahāranfūrī, Khalīl Aḥmad. (n.d.). *Badhl al-Majhūd fī Halli Abī Dāwūd*. ed. Muhammad Zakariyyā al-Kāndahawī. Beirut: Dar Al-Kotob al-Ilmiyah

Al-Shbūl, Ahmad. 1989. ‘Alāqat al-Ummah al-Islāmiyyah fī al-‘Aṣr al-Nabawī Ma‘ Bilād al-Shām Wa Bīzanṭah’, in *Arabia in the Age of the Prophet and the Four Caliphs* ed. al-Ansary, Abd al-Rahman T. Riyadh: King Saud University Press, 1st edition

Al-Suhailī, Abū al-Qāsim ‘Abd al-Raḥmān bin ‘Abdullāh bin Ahmad. (n.d.). *al-Rawḍ al-Unuf fī Tafṣīr al-Sīrah al-Nabawiyyah li Ibn Hishām*. ed. Al-Shūrā, Majdī bin Mansūr. Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 1st edition

ARTICLES IN JOURNALS:

El-Awaisi, Abd al-Fattah. 2005. ‘Islamic Jerusalem a new concept and definitions’, in *Journal of Islamic Jerusalem Studies* 6 (1)

UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL:

El-Awaisi, Abd al-Fattah. (n.d.). *Introducing Islamic Jerusalem*. Unpublished book.



El-Awaisi, Khalid. 2003. *Geographical Boundaries of Islamic Jerusalem*.

Unpublished dissertation, Al-Maktoum Institute for Arabic and Islamic Studies – UAD. Dundee

ELECTRONIC SOURCES:

‘*Maps Online*’, National Geographic homepage, 17th April 2005,
<http://mapmachine.nationalgeographic.com>

‘*Global Gazetteer*’, Directory of cities and towns in World, 30th June 2005,
<http://www.fallingrain.com/world>

MANUSCRIPTS:

Abū Dāwūd, Sulaymān bin al-Ash‘ath al-Sajistānī. *Sunan Abū Dawūd*. Copier:
Salāmah bin ‘Abdullāh bin ‘Abd al-Karīm al-‘Urābānī. 511 A.H. / 1117
C.E.

The British Library – London. Ref. ORI 8291

Abū Dāwūd, Sulaymān bin al-Ash‘ath al-Sajistānī. *Sunan Abū Dawūd*. Copier:
Unknown. 13th century C.E.

The British Library – London. Ref. ORI 8927



Appendix

Appendix 1:




Figure 6: Page 8 Recto from a manuscript of *Sunan Abū Dāwūd*, written in 511 A.H. / 1117 CE. The writer of this manuscript is Salāmah bin ‘Abdullāh bin ‘Abd al-Karīm al-‘Urābānī. The British Library – London. Ref: ORI 8291.



Appendix 2:




Figure 7: Page 248 Recto from a manuscript of Sunan Abū Dāwūd, written in the 13th century CE. The writer of this manuscript is unknown. The British Library – London. Ref: ORI 8927.